Fairness and Channel Coordination*

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Fairness and Channel Coordination

Abstract

In this paper, we incorporate the concept of fairness into a conventional dyadic channel to investigate how fairness may affect channel coordination. We show that when channel members are concerned about fairness, the manufacturer can use a simple wholesale price above its marginal cost to coordinate this channel both in terms of achieving the maximum channel profit and in terms of attaining the maximum channel utility. Thus, channel coordination may not require an elaborate pricing contract. A constant wholesale price will do.

Our results suggest that while a two-part tariff or a quantity discount schedule can still coordinate the fair channel, the manufacturer cannot use either mechanism to take away all of the channel profit. Indeed, the manufacturer may not be able to claim the largest share of the channel profit when the channel is so coordinated. In addition, such nonlinear pricing contracts may not foster channel harmony.

(Keyword: Distribution Channels; Fairness; Channel Coordination; Behavioral Economics)
“Even profit-maximizing firms will have an incentive to act in a manner that is perceived as fair if the individuals with whom they deal are willing to resist unfair transactions and punish unfair firms at some cost to themselves...willingness to enforce fairness is common.”


1 Introduction

Our objective in this paper is to examine how concerns about fairness affect the nature of optimal contracts in a marketing channel. There are four main motivations for us to take this initial step. First, research in behavioral economics in the past two decades has shown that “there is a significant incidence of cases in which firms, like individuals, are motivated by concerns of fairness” in business relationships, including channel relationships (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986). Studies in economics and marketing have long documented many cases where fairness plays an important role in developing and maintaining channel relationships (Okun 1981; Frazier 1983; Heide and John 1988,1992; Kaufmann and Stern 1988; Anderson and Weitz 1992; Hackett 1994; Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1998; Corsten and Kumar 2003,2005). For instance, through a large scale survey of car dealerships in the US and Netherlands, Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995) show convincingly that fairness is a significant determinant of the quality of channel relationships. Subsequent research has also documented many cases where both manufacturers and retailers may sacrifice their own margins for the benefit of their counterpart all in the name of fairness (Olmstead and Rhode 1985; Kumar 1996; Scheer, Kumar, and Steenkamp 2003). Therefore, fairness concerns are a factor that theoretical researchers may not want to ignore in some cases if they aim to develop good descriptive models of channel coordination.

Second, theoretical studies on channel coordination in the past typically assume that all channel members care only about their monetary payoffs. This focus on monetary payoffs has produced many well-known conclusions. For instance, in a conventional dyadic channel consisting of one manufacturer selling a product to a single retailer at a constant wholesale price, a price that does
not vary with the quantity of purchase, the well-known problem of “double marginalization” is always present such that the channel profit is always sub-optimal. The standard remedy for this problem is for the manufacturer to use a nonlinear pricing contract. For example, Jeuland and Shugan (1983) shows that a quantity discount schedule could induce the retailer to set the retail price at the channel-coordinating level. Moorthy (1987) shows that some other non-linear pricing contracts, such as a two-part tariff, can also coordinate the dyadic channel. However, it is not clear if these managerial prescriptions apply to a channel where some or all channel members care about monetary payoffs as well as fairness. It is also not clear if new managerial prescriptions are required when the channel members are fair-minded.

Third, as noted some ago by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), an incentive contract in the real world frequently takes a simpler form than what the theory would predict. This can happen because, aside from the cost of writing and implementing an intricate contract, a simple contract may be the optimal one in “a richer real world environment.” This can also happen because firms have little to lose using a simpler contract (Raju and Srinivasan 1996). In the channel context, we also observe in some cases that channel transactions are “governed by simple contracts defined only by a per unit wholesale price” (Lariviere and Porteus 2001). It is quite intriguing to investigate whether the simplicity of the channel contract is due to “a richer real world environment” where channel members care about fairness in their transactions.

Finally, practitioners are also concerned about fairness. Indeed, practitioners state that maintaining fairness in a distribution channel should be the supplier’s first concern (McCarthy 1985).

Although past theoretical models have devoted considerable attention to channel issues, none of them, to the best of our knowledge, investigate the implications of fairness in a channel context\(^1\). As

a first step, we shall start with the most basic channel structure—the dyadic channel, and introduce fairness in a parsimonious, tractable way as inequity aversion. The history of the intellectual discourse on distributive fairness can be traced to Plato’s *Republic* and Aristotle’s *Nichomachean Ethics* (Cohen 1987). In modern times, Adams (1965) saw the relevance of distributive fairness in commercial relationships. Concerns of distributive fairness are not just limited to individuals as economic agents. Researchers in sociology, marketing, psychology, and other disciplines have found that distributive fairness can play an important role in firms’ transactions with each other. This is because, as Macneil (1980) argues in advancing a long intellectual tradition (Adams 1963; Adams and Freedman 1976; and Blumstein and Weinstein 1969), the norm of mutuality between parties (e.g., partnering firms) in contracts requires some kind of “evenness” that assures adequate returns to each instead of requiring strict equality when dividing the exchange surplus. This view of commercial relationships is apparently quite influential in marketing as well, as discussed previously.\(^2\) For ease of exposition, we define a channel where one or more of its members cares about fairness as a “fair channel”.

Through analyzing this channel, we address the following basic questions:

1. Is the double marginalization problem always present in a channel where both monetary payoffs and fairness matter so that a nonlinear contract is always required to achieve the maximum channel profitability?

2. Can a nonlinear pricing contract, such as a two-part tariff or a quantity discount schedule, play the same channel-coordination role in this fair channel as in the conventional dyadic channel?

3. What are the mechanisms through which a pricing contract coordinates a “fair channel?”

\(^2\)In more recent years, another intellectual tradition has also joined the force to highlight the importance of fairness in commercial relationships. The famous Ultimatum Game developed by Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarz (1982) has been repeated in numerous experiments in various settings. Subjects in those experiments, including executive and full-time MBAs, have demonstrated a strong sense of fairness. In other lab experiments, researchers also find that subjects are averse to both disadvantageous and advantageous inequality between themselves and their partners (Loewenstein, Thompson and Bazerman 1989; Hackett 1994).
4. How do the manufacturer and the retailer fare under a channel coordination mechanism and what are the tradeoffs that the manufacturer needs to consider while choosing a channel coordination mechanism?

Our analysis shows that when a profit-maximizing manufacturer deals with the fair-minded retailer, the double marginalization problem does not always arise. Said differently, the manufacturer can use a constant wholesale price to align the retailer’s interest with the channel’s and coordinate the fair channel with a wholesale price higher than its marginal cost. Thus, indeed, a simpler contract can be optimal in a richer channel environment.

Our analysis further shows that a two-part tariff or a quantity discount schedule can also be used to coordinate a fair channel. However, neither can be used by the manufacturer to claim all channel profit in the presence of the retailer’s inequity aversion. Through careful analysis, we also identify the mechanism through which a particular pricing contract coordinates the fair channel and discuss the pros and cons of various pricing contracts for channel coordination. In this regard, we find that our intuitions gained from studying a conventional channel where only monetary payoffs matter often do not carry over to the fair channel.

For ease of exposition, we first set up and analyze a model where the retailer is fair-minded. Then, we extend our analysis to the case where the manufacturer also cares about fairness, instead of merely reacting to the retailer’s fairness concerns, and also to the case where the manufacturer and the retailer bargain over the wholesale price. In each of these settings, we compare the performance of a simple constant wholesale price contract, a two-part tariff contract, and a quantity discount and outline what tradeoffs are involved for the manufacturer to choose a channel coordination mechanism. Finally, we conclude with suggestions for future research.

2 Constant Wholesale Price and Channel Coordination

Consider the standard dyadic channel where a single manufacturer sells its product to consumers through a single retailer. For our basic model, we assume that the manufacturer moves first and
charges a constant wholesale price \( w \). Later in Section 6, we will relax this assumption and allow the two channel members to bargain over the wholesale price. Then, taking the wholesale price \( w \) as given, the retailer sets its price \( p \). For simplicity, we assume that only the manufacturer incurs a unit production cost \( c > 0 \) in this channel, and the market demand is given by \( D(p) = a - bp \), where \( b > 0 \). It is well-known that as long as all channel members care only about their monetary payoffs, the manufacturer cannot coordinate such a channel with only a constant wholesale price (Jeuland and Shugan 1983). In that case, as illustrated in Figure 1, the manufacturer will optimally choose to set its wholesale price at \( \hat{w} > c \) to maximize its own profit while leaving the channel profit suboptimal.

![Figure 1: Profits in Conventional Channel](image)

When the retailer also cares about fairness, besides their monetary payoffs, it will maximize a utility function \( u(w, p) \) that accounts for the retailer’s monetary payoff as well as its concern about fairness when setting its price. Later we shall analyze the case where both manufacturer and retailer care about fairness. In general, we can write

\[
    u(w, p) = \pi(w, p) + f_r(w, p),
\]

\[\textit{i.e.} \quad \text{that the monetary payoff } \pi(w, p) = (p - w)D(p) \text{ and the disutility due to inequity } f_r(w, p) \text{ enter} \]
the retailer’s utility function in an additive form. We can model fairness as inequity aversion à la Fehr and Schmidt (1999), such that the retailer is willing to “give up some monetary payoff to move in the direction of more equitable outcomes.” We assume that the equitable outcome for the retailer is a fraction $\gamma$ of the manufacturer’s payoff, or $\gamma \Pi(w, p)$, where $\Pi(w, p) = (w - c)D(p)$. In other words, the retailer’s equitable payoff is the payoff it deems deserving relative to the manufacturer’s payoff (see also Macneil 1980 and Frazier 1983). Here, $\gamma > 0$ broadly captures the channel members’ contributions and is exogenous to our model.

Thus, if the retailer’s monetary payoff is lower than the equitable payoff, a disadvantageous inequality occurs, which will result in a disutility for the retailer in the amount of $\alpha$ per unit difference in the two payoffs. If its monetary payoff is higher than the equitable payoff, an advantageous inequality occurs in the amount of $\beta$ per unit difference in the payoffs. Algebraically, we have

$$f_r(w, p) = -\alpha \max\{\gamma \Pi(w, p) - \pi(w, p), 0\} - \beta \max\{\pi(w, p) - \gamma \Pi(w, p), 0\}. \tag{2.2}$$

Such inequity aversion will motivate the retailer to reduce the disutility from inequity, whichever form it may take, even if the action reduces the retailer’s monetary payoff. Past research has shown that “subjects suffer more from inequity that is to their monetary disadvantage than from inequity that is to their monetary advantage” (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). Accordingly, we further assume $\beta \leq \alpha$ and $0 < \beta < 1$. In Table 1, we summarize our model notations for the ease of reference.

It is important to note here that the utility function specified in Equation (2.2), analogous to the common practice in the economics literature of specifying a utility function for a group of people or for a society, helps us to capture the retailer’s concerns for fairness in a succinct way.

The retailer only behaves as if it has such a utility function.\footnote{To see that this expression is quite general, let player $i$’s utility be given by $U_i(x) = \varphi_i(x, \Pi_i(x))$, where $x$ is the vector of all $n$ players’ decisions $\{x_1, \ldots, x_n\}$ and $\Pi_i(x)$ is player $i$’s monetary payoff. This utility function is equivalent to $U_i(x) = \Pi_i(x) + \varphi_i(x, \Pi_i(x)) - \Pi_i(x)$. If we denote $\varphi_i(x, \Pi_i(x)) - \Pi_i(x)$ as $f_i(x)$, then we have $U_i(x) = \Pi_i(x) + f_i(x)$ as in the text.}
Table 1: Variable Definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$c$</td>
<td>manufacturer’s marginal production cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p, w, F$</td>
<td>retail price, wholesale price, and manufacturer-charged flat fee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D(p) = a - bp$</td>
<td>market demand, $b &gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi, \Pi, \Pi_c$</td>
<td>profit functions respectively for retailer, manufacturer and channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u, U$</td>
<td>utility functions for retailer and manufacturer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$f_r, f_m$</td>
<td>disutility functions for retailer and manufacturer due to inequity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha, \alpha_0$</td>
<td>retailer’s and manufacturer’s disadvantageous inequality parameters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta, \beta_0$</td>
<td>retailer’s and manufacturer’s advantageous inequality parameters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma, \mu$</td>
<td>retailer’s and manufacturer’s equitable payoff parameters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p^*$</td>
<td>channel-coordinating retail price, $p^* = \frac{a + bc}{2b}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1 Retailer’s Decisions

The introduction of fairness into the dyadic channel does not change the channel’s maximum profit, which is given by $\Pi_c(p^*) = (p^* - c)D(p^*)$ where $p^* = \arg\max \Pi_c(p) = \frac{a + bc}{2b}$. However, the retailer’s concerns with fairness will affect the interactions between the two channel members and ultimately determine what channel profit is achievable. We now proceed to derive the equilibrium in this channel.

Given wholesale price $w$, the retailer will choose a retail price $p$ to maximize its utility given by equations (2.1) and (2.2). As this utility function is not everywhere differentiable, we derive the retailer’s optimal decision in two steps. First, we derive the retailer’s optimal decision conditional on the retailer’s monetary payoff being either lower or higher than its equitable payoff. In the former case, i.e. $\pi(w, p) - \gamma \Pi(w, p) = (p - w)D(p) - \gamma(w - c)D(p) \leq 0$, the retailer experiences disadvantageous inequality. In the latter case, i.e. $\pi(w, p) - \gamma \Pi(w, p) = (p - w)D(p) - \gamma(w - c)D(p) \geq 0$, the retailer experiences advantageous inequality. Second, the optimal solutions from both cases are compared to determine the retailer’s global optimal solution.

When the retailer effects disadvantageous inequality, $\pi(w, p) - \gamma \Pi(w, p) = (p - w)D(p) - \gamma(w -$
c) $D(p) \leq 0$ or equivalently $p \leq (1 + \gamma)w - \gamma c$, the retailer’s optimization problem is given below

$$\max_p \ (p - w)(a - bp) - \alpha[\gamma(w - c) - (p - w)](a - bp),$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad p \leq (1 + \gamma)w - \gamma c.$$  

(2.3) (2.4)

The optimal price and the maximum utility for the retailer, conditional on disadvantageous inequality, are given below

$$p_1 = \begin{cases} \frac{(a + bw)(1 + \alpha) + ab\gamma(w - c)}{2b(1 + \alpha)} & \text{if } w > w_1 \\ (1 + \gamma)w - \gamma c & \text{if otherwise} \end{cases}$$

(2.5)

where $w_1 = \frac{a + b + b\alpha c + 2b\gamma c}{b(1 + \alpha + \alpha \gamma + 2\gamma)}$. The retailer’s utility is given by

$$u_1 = \begin{cases} \frac{(a - bw)(1 + \alpha) - ab\gamma(w - c)}{4b(1 + \alpha)} & \text{if } w > w_1 \\ \gamma(w - c)[a - bw - b\gamma(w - c)] & \text{if otherwise} \end{cases}$$

(2.6)

Similarly, if the retailer’s pricing decision results in advantageous inequality, its monetary payoff is no lower than its equitable payoff, or $\pi(w, p) - \gamma \Pi(w, p) = (p - w)D(p) - \gamma(w - c)D(p) \geq 0$. The retailer’s optimization problem becomes

$$\max_p \ (p - w)(a - bp) - \beta[(p - w) - \gamma(w - c)](a - bp)$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad p \geq (1 + \gamma)w - \gamma c.$$  

(2.7) (2.8)

Define

$$\bar{p}_2 = \frac{(a + bw)(1 - \beta) - b\gamma(w - c)}{2b(1 - \beta)}, \quad \text{and} \quad w_2 = \frac{a - a\beta - b\gamma c + 2b\gamma c}{b(1 - \beta - \beta \gamma + 2\gamma)}$$

(2.9)

The retailer’s optimal price and the maximum utility in the case of advantageous inequality are given by

$$p_2 = \begin{cases} \bar{p}_2 & \text{if } w \leq w_2 \\ (1 + \gamma)w - \gamma c & \text{if } w > w_2 \end{cases} \quad u_2 = \begin{cases} \frac{(a - bw)(1 - \beta) + b\gamma(w - c)}{4b(1 - \beta)} & \text{if } w \leq w_2 \\ \gamma(w - c)[a - bw - b\gamma(w - c)] & \text{if } w > w_2. \end{cases}$$

(2.10)

As the retailer is in the position to cause either advantageous or disadvantageous inequality, it will choose in a way to maximize its utility. The retailer’s optimal decision will depend on whether
$u_1$ in equation (2.6) is larger than $u_2$ in equation (2.10). It is straightforward to show that $w_1 > w_2$ always holds and that we have

$$
\begin{align*}
  u_1 &\leq u_2 \quad \text{if } w \leq w_2 \\
u_1 &= u_2 \quad \text{if } w_2 < w \leq w_1 \\
u_1 &> u_2 \quad \text{if } w > w_1
\end{align*}
$$

(2.11)

This means that for any given $w$, the retailer’s optimal price is given by

$$
p(w) = \begin{cases} 
  \frac{a + bw}{2b} - \frac{\beta \gamma (w-c)}{2(1-\beta)} & \text{if } w \leq w_2 \\
  w + \gamma (w - c) & \text{if } w_2 < w \leq w_1 \\
  \frac{a + bw}{2b} + \frac{\alpha \gamma (w-c)}{2(1+\alpha)} & \text{if } w > w_1
\end{cases}
$$

(2.12)

Equation (2.12) reveals something interesting about how the fair-minded retailer makes its pricing decision. At any given $w$, the price that maximizes the retailer’s monetary payoff is given by $\hat{p} = \frac{a + bw}{2b}$, which is also the optimal price for the retailer if it does not care about fairness. However, because of its fairness concern, the retailer will set a price below $\hat{p}$ in response to the manufacturer setting a very low wholesale price ($w \leq w_2$). In this case, the prospect of advantageous inequality prompts the retailer to sacrifice its own monetary payoff to reward the manufacturer. In contrast, when the manufacturer charges a very high wholesale price ($w > w_1$), the retailer faces the prospect of disadvantageous inequality if it were to set a price for profit maximization. In this case, the retailer charges a price higher than $\hat{p}$ and sacrifices its own monetary payoff to punish the manufacturer. When the manufacturer sets an intermediate wholesale price, the retailer will respond by setting a price that achieves the equitable outcome: neither advantageous nor disadvantageous inequality will occur.

### 2.2 Manufacturer’s Decisions

For now we assume that the manufacturer sets its wholesale price $w$ only to maximize its profit $\Pi(w) = (w - c)[a - bp(w)]$ in anticipation of the retailer’s reactions through $p(w)$ given in equation (2.12). This assumption allows us to develop some intuition about how fairness shapes channel interactions in a parsimonious manner. We will extend our analysis in Section 6 to the case where
the manufacturer also cares about fairness. We simply note here that this extension will not alter our main conclusions, but will yield some additional insights.

Our analysis of the manufacturer’s decisions is similar to that for the retailer, proceeding in two steps. First, we determine the most profitable wholesale price for the manufacturer in each of the three price ranges indicated in equation (2.12). Second, we compare the resulting payoffs to determine the globally optimal payoff for the manufacturer. For brevity, we leave the detailed derivations in Appendix A and summarize our results in the following proposition.

**Proposition 1**  
The manufacturer can coordinate a dyadic channel with a constant wholesale price \( w \) if the retailer is sufficiently inequity averse (\( \alpha \geq \max \{ \frac{\beta}{\beta + \gamma}, \beta \} \) and \( \beta \geq \frac{1}{1+\gamma} \)). The manufacturer achieves channel coordination by setting a wholesale price higher than its marginal cost (\( w^* = \frac{a+bc+2bc\gamma}{2b(1+\gamma)} \)) and obtains a payoff of \( \Pi^* = \frac{(a-bc)^2}{4b(1+\gamma)} \). The retailer sets, in response, its price at \( p^* \) and gets a payoff of \( \pi^* = u^* = \frac{(a-bc)^2\gamma}{4b(1+\gamma)} \).

Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 2. From Figure 2, we see that fairness concerns on the part of the retailer has introduced considerable nonlinearity in each channel member’s payoff function.

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4In Figure 2, the channel coordinating conditions \( \alpha \geq \max \{ \frac{\beta}{\beta + \gamma}, \beta \} \) and \( \beta \geq \frac{1}{1+\gamma} \) are satisfied.
and hence into the payoff function for the whole channel, as compared to the payoff functions for the conventional channel (Figure 1) where fairness concerns are absent. Yet, in equilibrium, all channel members’ incentives are aligned to the benefit of the channel as a whole: the manufacturer chooses the wholesale price that maximizes not only its own profitability, but also the retailer’s as well as the channel’s.

Intuitively, the retailer’s concern with fairness introduces two unexpected opportunities for channel coordination. First, inequity aversion on the part of the retailer can exacerbate the problem of double-marginalization, as the retailer may mark-up its price excessively to punish the manufacturer for setting an “unfairly” high wholesale price. However, it can also alleviate the problem when the retailer sacrifices its own margin to reward the manufacturer for a “generous” wholesale price. Under the right condition (e.g., $\beta = \frac{1}{1+\gamma}$), the manufacturer can be motivated by the reward to charge a wholesale price that is sufficiently low, but still above its marginal cost ($w = w_2 = w^*$) to coordinate the channel. Second, when the manufacturer charges some intermediate wholesale price ($w_2 < w \leq w_1$), the fair-minded retailer is better off effecting an equitable outcome where neither advantageous nor disadvantageous inequality occurs and achieving a payoff of $\gamma \Pi$. As a result, the fair-minded retailer voluntarily aligns its interest with the manufacturer’s. In this case, as the manufacturer sets its wholesale price at $w^*$ to maximize its profit $\Pi$, it also maximizes the retailer’s payoff $\gamma \Pi$ as well as the channel profit $(1 + \gamma)\Pi$.

Note that when the channel is coordinated, the manufacturer’s wholesale price is above its marginal cost. Furthermore, relative to the optimal wholesale price in the corresponding decentralized channel absent of any fairness concerns, i.e. $w = \frac{a}{2b} + \frac{c}{2}$, the manufacturer’s wholesale price in this fair channel is lower, weighing less heavily on the demand factors ($\frac{a}{2b}$), but more on the marginal cost ($c$). Thus, Proposition 1 also suggests that the retailer’s fairness concerns have a tendency to depress a channel’s wholesale price while encouraging more cost-based pricing.

The main significance of Proposition 1 lies, however, in the observation that channel coordi-
nation does not require an elaborate pricing contract. A constant wholesale price will do, as long as the retailer is fair-minded. This means that the presence of only a constant wholesale price in a channel is not an indication that the manufacturer lacks interest in channel coordination or that it may be using some other complex but undisclosed pricing contract. Indeed, a manufacturer may even have a good reason to prefer this simple pricing mechanism, as stated in the following proposition.

**Proposition 2** When a fair channel is coordinated through a constant wholesale price, no inequity exists in the channel. Therefore, a constant wholesale price as a channel coordination mechanism fosters an equitable channel relationship.

Proposition 2 thus uncovers the lure of a constant wholesale price as the pricing mechanism of choice in distribution channels. It also highlights the importance of an equitable distribution of channel profits in channel management.

### 3 Two-Part Tariff and Channel Coordination

In a channel where all channel members care only about their monetary payoffs, Moorthy (1987) shows that a two-part tariff can coordinate the channel. The manufacturer can simply set its wholesale price at the marginal cost $c$ to turn the retailer into the “residual claimant” of channel profits (the receiver of any marginal channel profit). Then, the retailer will, driven by its own monetary interest, strive to maximize channel profits. The manufacturer is willing to use the marginal-cost pricing in the first place because it can charge a flat fee to appropriate all channel profits. However, in the fair channel, this “residual clamant” mechanism breaks down, as the retailer no longer pursues the maximization of its own monetary payoff. In addition, a flat fee can no longer be used to appropriate all channel profits, as doing so will result in extreme inequity. Thus, the question naturally arises: can a two-part tariff still play the same channel coordination role when the retailer abhors inequity? If it could still coordinate the channel, through what mechanism is
the channel coordination achieved?

In this section, we investigate the role of the two-part tariff in coordinating a fair channel by
allowing the manufacturer first to set a wholesale price \( w \) and a fixed payment \( F \). The retailer then
sets its price \( p \) after observing \((w, F)\). We maintain all other assumptions in the previous section.
The payoff for the manufacturer and the retailer’s utility function are now respectively given by

\[
\Pi(w, F, p) = (w - c)D(p) + F, \tag{3.1}
\]

\[
u(w, F, p) = \pi(w, F, p) + f_r(w, F, p) = (p - w)D(p) - F + f_r(w, F, p), \tag{3.2}
\]

where \( f_r(w, F, p) = -\alpha \max\{\gamma \Pi(w, F, p) - \pi(w, F, p), 0\} - \beta \max\{\pi(w, F, p) - \gamma \Pi(w, F, p), 0\} \).

### 3.1 Retailer’s Decisions Under Two-Part Tariff

We can analyze the retailer’s decision for any given \((w, F)\) in the same way as in the previous
section, although the analysis here becomes more complex. As we show in Appendix B, the retailer
can once again effect either advantageous or disadvantageous inequity through the choice of the
retail price \( p \). The retailer’s optimal price for any \((w, F)\) is given by

\[
p(w, F) = \begin{cases}
\frac{a + bw}{2b} + \frac{\alpha \gamma (w-c)}{2(1+\alpha)} & \text{if } \Delta < \frac{1}{(1+\alpha)^2} b^2 \gamma^2 (w-c)^2 \\
\frac{a + bw + b\gamma (w-c) - \sqrt{\Delta}}{2b} & \text{if } \frac{1}{(1+\alpha)^2} b^2 \gamma^2 (w-c)^2 \leq \Delta \leq \frac{1}{(1-\beta)^2} b^2 \gamma^2 (w-c)^2 \\
\frac{a + bw}{2b} - \frac{\beta \gamma (w-c)}{2(1-\beta)} & \text{if } \Delta > \frac{1}{(1-\beta)^2} b^2 \gamma^2 (w-c)^2
\end{cases} \tag{3.3}
\]

where \( \Delta = [a - bw - b\gamma (w-c)]^2 - 4b(1 + \gamma)F \). Note that should the retailer decide to participate
in the channel, its optimal price hinges on the flat fee it has to pay, in contrast to a model of pure
economic rationality, because of its fairness concerns.

### 3.2 Manufacturer’s Design of Two-Part Tariff

The manufacturer chooses \((w, F)\) to maximize its own payoff \( \Pi(w, F) = (w - c)[a - bp(w)] + F \),
where \( p(w) \) is given in equation (3.3). This is a non-trivial optimization problem because of the
non-linear price response from the retailer to the manufacturer’s decisions \((w, F)\). However, as we
show in Appendix B, the manufacturer can indeed use a two-part tariff to coordinate the channel. We summarize this analysis in the following proposition.

**Proposition 3** For any $\alpha \geq \beta$, $0 \leq \beta < 1$, and $\gamma > 0$, the manufacturer optimally chooses the two-part tariff $[c, \frac{(a-bc)^2(1+\alpha)}{4b(1+\alpha+\alpha\gamma)}]$ to coordinate the fair channel. However, when compared to the case where fairness concerns are not present, the manufacturer can no longer take all channel profit as long as the retailer abhors any disadvantageous inequity ($\alpha > 0$).

Unexpectedly, the two-part tariff coordinates the fair channel through a rather elegant mechanism. By setting its wholesale price at the marginal cost $c$, the manufacturer effectively uses one stone to kill two birds. On the one hand, the manufacturer removes the double marginalization problem in the channel so that the retailer becomes the residual claimant of the channel profit. More concretely, the channel profit is now the same as the retailer's and is given by $\pi(c, F^*, p)$, $F^* = \frac{(a-bc)^2(1+\alpha)}{4b(1+\alpha+\alpha\gamma)}$. Therefore, the retailer wants to maximize the channel profit for any given level of inequality in payoffs. On the other hand, by setting $w = c$, the manufacturer makes no contribution from its sales, which effectively takes away the retailer’s incentive to rectify any payoff inequity through distorting its own pricing decision. In fact, to alleviate inequity under the two-part tariff contract contained in Proposition 3, all that the retailer can do is to increase its own profitability. We can see this from Equation (3.2) where the disutility from inequity is given by $f_r(c, F^*, p) = -\alpha(\gamma F^* - \pi(c, F^*, p))$. This means that when $w = c$, the utility maximization for the retailer becomes maximizing $(1 + \alpha)\pi(c, F^*, p) - \alpha\gamma F^*$. Thus, the retailer is driven by both profit and fairness motives to maximize its own as well as the channel profit.

However, in this fair channel, the manufacturer cannot take away all channel profits as it can in the conventional channel where only monetary payoffs matter. Indeed, it may not even get more monetary payoffs than the retailer due to the presence of perceived inequity in the distribution of channel profits, as stated in the following proposition.

**Proposition 4** When the manufacturer uses a two-part tariff to coordinate the fair channel, the
retailer suffers from disadvantageous inequality for which the manufacturer must compensate the retailer in order for the latter to become a willing participant in the channel. As a result, the retailer can obtain a bigger monetary payoff than the manufacturer if \( \frac{\alpha \gamma}{1+\alpha} > 1 \).

Proposition 4 is straightforward to prove. When the manufacturer sets \((c, F^*)\) in Proposition 3, the retailer suffers disadvantageous inequality as measured by \( f(c, p^*) = -\alpha[\gamma F^* - \pi(c, p^*)] \), which is strictly negative. To satisfy the retailer’s participation constraint, the manufacturer must set \( F^* \) such that the retailer’s monetary payoff plus disutility from disadvantageous inequality must be exactly equal to zero, or \( \pi(c, p^*) - \alpha[\gamma F^* - \pi(c, p^*)] = 0 \). This implies that we have \( \pi(c, p^*) = \frac{\alpha \gamma}{1+\alpha} F^* \). Recall that \( F^* \) is also the manufacturer’s profit. Thus, the retailer makes more profit than the manufacturer if \( \frac{\alpha \gamma}{1+\alpha} > 1 \).

What emerges here is a channel relationship where either the manufacturer or the retailer can get ahead in terms of claiming the channel profit, depending on the perceived equitable division of channel profits and on the retailer’s tolerance for inequity.

4 Quantity Discount and Channel Coordination

Jeuland and Shugan (1983) have shown that a quantity discount schedule can coordinate a dyadic channel where only monetary payoffs matter. Could the same pricing mechanism profitably coordinate the fair channel? Furthermore, relative to the two-part tariff, is the quantity discount schedule a superior channel coordination mechanism for the manufacturer? We investigate these questions in this section.

In order for the retailer to choose the channel coordinating retail price \( p^* = \frac{a+bc}{2b} \), the manufacturer needs to use its wholesale price schedule \( w(D) \) to transform the retailer’s utility function into a function directly related to the channel profit. In the context of the fair channel, this transformation is possible, à la Jeuland and Shugan (1983), if a \( w(D) \) exists so that we have

\[
u(w, p) = [p - w(D)]D(p) - f_r(w, p) = k_1(p - c)D(p) + k_2 \tag{4.1}\]
where \( f_r(w, p) = -\alpha \max\{\gamma \Pi(w, p) - \pi(w, p), 0\} - \beta \max\{\pi(w, p) - \gamma \Pi(w, p), 0\}, \beta \leq \alpha, \) and \( 0 \leq \beta < 1. \)

Intuitively, to maximize its own profit, the manufacturer never wants to use its quantity discount schedule to induce advantageous inequality in the channel. Doing so would hurt its own profitability while also aggravating the retailer.\(^5\) Thus, the quantity discount schedule that coordinates this fair channel can be found, if it exists, from the following equation

\[
u(w, p) = (p - w)D(p) - \alpha[\gamma(w - c)D(p) - (p - w)D(p)] = k_1(p - c)D(p) + k_2. \tag{4.2}\]

Indeed, such a schedule exists and is unique, as stated in the following proposition.

**Proposition 5** The channel-coordinating quantity discount schedule takes the form of \( w(D) = \frac{1}{1 + \alpha + \alpha\gamma}[(1 - k_1 + \alpha)p(D) + \alpha\gamma c + k_1 c - \frac{k_2}{D}]. \)

Under this schedule, the retailer sets \( p^* \), orders the quantity of \( a - bp^* \) from the manufacturer, and pays a discounted wholesale price of

\[
w = \frac{(1 + \alpha)(a + bc) + 2\alpha\gamma c - k_1(a - bc)}{2b(1 + \alpha + \alpha\gamma)} - \frac{2k_2}{(a - bc)(1 + \alpha + \alpha\gamma)} \tag{4.3}.
\]

The manufacturer’s payoff is given by

\[
\Pi = \frac{(a - bc)^2(1 + \alpha) - [(a - bc)^2k_1 + 4bk_2]}{4b(1 + \alpha + \alpha\gamma)} \tag{4.4}
\]

Of course, the manufacturer will choose \( k_1 \) and \( k_2 \) to maximize its own payoff and the maximum payoff for the manufacturer is given by

\[
\Pi = \frac{(a - bc)^2(1 + \alpha)}{4b(1 + \alpha + \alpha\gamma)} \tag{4.5}
\]

The retailer’s monetary payoff under the quantity discount schedule is given by

\[
\pi = \frac{(a - bc)^2\alpha\gamma}{4b(1 + \alpha + \alpha\gamma)} \tag{4.6}
\]

\(^5\)It is straightforward to offer a rigorous proof to rule out this scenario.
Surprisingly, both the manufacturer and the retailer get the same monetary payoffs under the quantity discount schedule as under the two-part tariff (recalling Proposition 3). Indeed, the retailer’s experience under the quantity discount schedule is also the same, suffering from the same level of disadvantageous inequality. However, the mechanism through which the quantity discount schedule coordinates the fair channel is different. The quantity discount schedule coordinates the fair channel by making sure that the retailer has a fixed share of the channel profit and faces the marginal wholesale price equal to $c$, the marginal cost to the channel. This mechanism is implemented such that the retailer’s marginal profit and marginal disutility from disadvantageous inequality are both proportional to the marginal channel profit (all with respect to price) with the former dominating.\(^6\) Thus, as the retailer maximizes its utility, it also maximizes the channel profit.

### 5 Manufacturer’s Choice of Channel Coordination Mechanisms

Our analysis has thus shown that in the fair channel, the manufacturer has more ways to coordinate the channel when the retailer is fair-minded. A well-selected wholesale price or two-part tariff or quantity discount schedule can all coordinate such a channel. The consequence of channel coordination is no longer limited to the size and division of channel profits and the manufacturer must weigh various tradeoffs in order to choose its channel coordination mechanism.

If the monetary payoff is the manufacturer’s sole criterion, the manufacturer’s choice is quite simple. Our analysis shows that the two-part tariff and the quantity discount schedule are equivalent pricing mechanisms for channel coordination. They all deliver the same monetary payoff to the manufacturer and the payoff is strictly higher than if a constant wholesale price is used, as long as $\gamma > 0$. This does not mean, however, that the manufacturer should always switch to one of the nonlinear pricing schedules if it is currently using the channel-coordinating wholesale price. We

\[ \frac{\partial \mu}{\partial p} = \frac{(\gamma - \gamma \psi_1 - \psi_1) \alpha}{1 + \alpha + \gamma}(a + bc - 2bp) \]

\[ \frac{\partial f_r}{\partial p} = \frac{\alpha + \psi_1}{1 + \alpha + \gamma}(a + bc - 2bp). \]

---

\(^6\) It is straightforward to show that under $w(D)$ in Proposition 5, we have $\frac{\partial \mu}{\partial p} = \frac{\alpha + \psi_1}{1 + \alpha + \gamma}(a + bc - 2bp)$ and $\frac{\partial f_r}{\partial p} = \frac{(\gamma - \gamma \psi_1 - \psi_1) \alpha}{1 + \alpha + \gamma}(a + bc - 2bp)$.  

17
can conduct the comparative statics on the percentage gain in payoffs from such switching \( \frac{\gamma}{1+\alpha+\alpha\gamma} \), which increases with \( \gamma \) but decreases with \( \alpha \). In other words, in a channel where the manufacturer dominates such that the equitable payoff for the retailer is small (a small \( \gamma \)) or where the retailer is sensitive to disadvantageous inequality (a large \( \alpha \)), there is less a gain from such switching.

Indeed, the superiority of the two-part tariff and the quantity discount schedule in delivering monetary payoffs to the manufacturer comes at the cost of equity in the channel. As our analysis has shown, under either pricing mechanism, the retailer suffers from disadvantageous inequality: the retailer perceives to get a less than equitable share of the channel profit. Thus, the retailer may rightfully become suspicious of and resentful to, any upstream nonlinear price contract. In contrast, when a constant wholesale price is used to coordinate the channel, an equitable division of channel profits is achieved and the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s interests are aligned equitably. Thus, to promote channel equity, a constant wholesale price trumps the two-part tariff or the quantity discount schedule as a channel coordination mechanism.

Operationally, when a constant wholesale price is used to coordinate the fair channel, the manufacturer essentially uses its wholesale price to invoke the retailer’s sense of fairness and equity to align the retailer’s interest with the channel’s. The implementation of the price contract is direct and intuitive. When the two-part tariff is used to coordinate the fair channel, the manufacturer must succeed in convincing the retailer to pay an upfront fee in order to join the channel membership. It must also convince the retailer that it makes no profit from the sales of its product such that the retailer has no reason to distort its pricing decision out of its fairness concerns. In the case of the quantity discount schedule, the manufacturer must design it in a way that would give the retailer a fixed share of the channel profit so as to motivate the retailer to maximize the channel profitability. In addition, the schedule must be so designed that the marginal price facing the retailer at the channel-coordinating sales level is the marginal cost for the entire channel. Thus, arguably, the implementation of the latter two nonlinear pricing mechanisms requires more influence, persuasion,
and possibly even coercion.

In a dynamic marketplace, the manufacturer may also want to consider how the changes in the market environment may impact its profitability under different channel coordination mechanisms. Through comparative statics, it is easy to see that the manufacturer’s profitability varies less under the constant wholesale price than under any of the two nonlinear pricing mechanisms due to the changes in the demand and cost factors. In addition, under the constant wholesale price, the manufacturer’s payoff is independent of $\alpha$, while it is not otherwise, thus immunizing the manufacturer from the whim of the retailer’s sensitivity to disadvantageous inequality. However, the impact on the manufacturer’s profitability of a changing standard on the “equitable” division of the channel profit ($\gamma$) is larger under the constant wholesale price than under any of the two alternatives, unless the retailer is both “powerful” and “sensitive” ($\gamma > 1$ and $\alpha > \frac{1}{\gamma^{2} - 1}$).

Therefore, in a fair channel, the manufacturer’s choice of the channel coordination mechanism is quite consequential, not only in terms of the monetary payoff it may gain, but also in terms of maintaining a equitable channel relationship. To the extent that a monetary payoff is more important for the channel relationship that is temporary and asymmetric in favor of the manufacturer, one would expect that a nonlinear pricing contract is more likely to emerge from it. When the channel relationship is for the long haul with a powerful retailer, one would expect that a constant wholesale price is more likely to be the channel coordination mechanism of choice.

6 Extensions

The analysis we have conducted so far is in the spirit of examining whether “profit maximizing-firms will have an incentive to act in a manner that is perceived as fair if the individuals with whom they deal are willing to resist unfair transactions and punish unfair firms at some cost to themselves” (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986). However, in practice, the manufacturer may be fair-minded, too. Furthermore, in our basic model, the manufacturer is assumed to dictate the wholesale price, while in practice, the manufacturer and the retailer may bargain over the wholesale
price. In this section, we consider both extensions to our basic model.

6.1 Fair-Minded Manufacturer

When the manufacturer is fair-minded, we assume that the manufacturer considers a payoff of $\mu \pi$ as the fair payoff to itself, where $\mu > 0$ is a positive, exogenous parameter analogous to $\gamma$ in our basic model and $\pi$ is the retailer’s monetary payoff. With its fairness concerns, the manufacturer no longer strives to maximize only its monetary payoff. Its objective is to maximize its utility defined as

$$U(X, p) = \Pi(X, p) + f_m(X, p),$$  \hspace{1cm} (6.1)$$

where $X$ is the manufacturer’s decision variable(s) and

$$f_m(X, p) = -\alpha_0 \max\{\mu \pi(X, p) - \Pi(X, p), 0\} - \beta_0 \max\{\Pi(X, p) - \mu \pi(X, p), 0\}.$$

For the same reason as in our basic model, we assume $\beta_0 \leq \alpha_0$ and $0 \leq \beta_0 < 1$. Note that our basic model is a special case of the extended model with $\alpha_0 = 0$ and $\beta_0 = 0$.

There are two possible scenarios to this extension. First, the manufacturer may be the only fair-minded channel member. Second, the manufacturer and the retailer are both fair-minded. The first scenario is closer to the case of the conventional channel. As we show in Technical Appendix C\textsuperscript{7}, if only the manufacturer is fair-minded, the channel can never be coordinated with a constant wholesale price as the double marginalization problem can never be removed. In fact, depending on the magnitude of $\mu$, or what the manufacturer considers to be its equitable payoff, the double marginalization problem may become less or more severe because of the manufacturer’s fairness concerns. In other words, the fair-minded manufacturer may not be a blessing to the channel if the manufacturer deems a very high payoff as equitable($\mu > 2$).

When both channel members care about fairness, channel interactions become more complex and interesting. In this case, what they each consider as fair is an important barometer for gauging

\textsuperscript{7}Optional Appendices are available from authors upon request.
the outcome of channel interactions. On the one hand, the retailer considers a payoff of \( \gamma \Pi \) as equitable. This means that the retailer considers \( \frac{\gamma}{1+\gamma} \Pi_c \) to be the equitable share of the channel profit for its participation in the channel. On the other hand, the manufacturer considers its own equitable share to be \( \frac{\mu}{1+\mu} \Pi_c \). The sum of these two equitable shares is the minimum profit that the channel has to produce in order to satisfy both channel members’ desire for an equitable outcome. We refer to this minimum channel profit as the Equity-Capable Channel Payoff (ECCP). We have

\[
ECCP = \frac{\gamma}{1+\gamma} \Pi_c + \frac{\mu}{1+\mu} \Pi_c = \frac{\mu \gamma + \mu + \gamma + \mu \gamma}{\mu \gamma + \mu + \gamma + 1} \Pi_c. \tag{6.2}
\]

In the case where \( ECCP > \Pi_c \) for a channel, or \( \mu \gamma > 1 \), we shall refer to this channel as the acrimonious channel. In this channel, the two channel members jointly desire more monetary payoffs than what the channel is capable of producing and hence either upstream or downstream inequity will result regardless of whether the channel is coordinated or how it is coordinated. In the case where \( ECCP \leq \Pi_c \) or \( \mu \gamma \leq 1 \), we shall refer to this channel as the harmonious channel. For this channel, an equitable division of channel profits is feasible. We summarize our analysis of the case where the manufacturer only uses a constant wholesale price in the following proposition\(^8\).

**Proposition 6** The manufacturer can use the wholesale price derived in Proposition 1 to coordinate an acrimonious channel as long as it is not too averse to its own disadvantageous inequality or \( \alpha_0 \leq \frac{1}{\mu \gamma - 1} \). It can do the same to coordinate a harmonious channel as long as it is not sufficiently averse to its own advantageous inequality, or \( \beta_0 \leq \frac{1}{1+\mu} \) if \( \beta = \frac{1}{1+\mu} \) and \( \alpha \geq \max\{\gamma-1, \beta\} \) and \( \beta_0 < 1 \) if \( \beta > \frac{1}{1+\gamma} \) and \( \alpha \geq \max\{\gamma-1, \beta\} \).

Intuitively, when charging a constant wholesale price to coordinate the channel, the manufacturer must rely, as we have discussed before, on the retailer’s desire to effect an equitable outcome to align the retailer’s interest with the channel’s. In turn, this means that the manufacturer must be willing to make some sacrifice and bear any disadvantageous (advantageous) inequity when dealing

\(^8\)The detailed analysis and proofs are contained in Technical Appendix C.
with the acrimonious (harmonious) channel, since the retailer must not bear any. That is why $\alpha_0$ ($\beta_0$) must be sufficiently small when facing the acrimonious (harmonious) channel.

In the case where the manufacturer uses a nonlinear pricing mechanism, we can analogously distinguish, from the perspective of the manufacturer, the acrimonious channel from the harmonious channel by testing whether $\mu \gamma > 1 + \frac{1}{\alpha}$. We summarize our analysis in the following proposition.

**Proposition 7** The manufacturer will use the same two-part tariff (quantity discount) schedule as in the basic model to coordinate the acrimonious channel if $\alpha_0 \leq \frac{1+\alpha}{\alpha \mu \gamma - 1 - \alpha}$ and the harmonious channel if $\beta_0 \leq \alpha_0$ and $\beta_0 < 1$ ($\beta_0 \leq \frac{1}{1 + \mu}$).

Intuitively, facing an acrimonious channel, the manufacturer will once again have to suffer disadvantageous inequality itself to coordinate the channel and thus must have some tolerance for it to embrace channel coordination. When facing a harmonious channel, the manufacturer must suffer advantageous inequality to bring about channel coordination and hence it needs to have a sufficient tolerance for it. In either case, the retailer suffers from disadvantageous inequality as in our basic model.

Propositions 6 and 7 together suggest that an equitable channel relationship is harder to come by when all channel members are averse to inequity. This outcome may seem counter-intuitive at first, but it is quite plausible upon some reflection. It captures the fact that it is harder to achieve equity when each channel member views equity from their own parochial perspective. In effect, fairness concerns can become a source of friction in channel relationships.

### 6.2 Bargaining with Fair-Minded Retailer

In our basic model, the manufacturer dictates the wholesale price. We show now that this assumption is indeed innocuous, as bargaining over the wholesale price will not qualitatively alter our main conclusion.

To introduce bargaining into the fair channel, we assume that the wholesale price is determined in the first stage through the Nash bargaining game while maintaining all other assumptions in
our basic model. This means that once the wholesale price $w$ is set, the fair-minded retailer will set its price in accordance to Equation (2.12). Then, the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s utility functions in the first stage are respectively given by

$$U(w) = \begin{cases} \frac{(w-c)(a-bw)(1-\beta)+b\gamma(w-c)}{2(1-\beta)} & \text{if } w \leq w_2 \\ \frac{(w-c)(a-bw-b\gamma(w-c))}{2(1-\alpha)} & \text{if } w_2 \leq w \leq w_1 \\ \frac{(w-c)(a-bw)(1+\alpha)-ab\gamma(w-c)}{2(1+\alpha)} & \text{if } w \geq w_1 \end{cases} \tag{6.3}$$

$$u(w) = \begin{cases} \frac{[(a-bw)(1-\beta)+b\gamma(w-c)]^2}{4\delta(1-\beta)} & \text{if } w \leq w_2 \\ \gamma(w-c)[a-bw-b\gamma(w-c)] & \text{if } w_2 \leq w \leq w_1 \\ \frac{[(a-bw)(1+\alpha)-ab\gamma(w-c)]^2}{4\delta(1+\alpha)} & \text{if } w \geq w_1. \end{cases} \tag{6.4}$$

For simplicity, we assume that both channel members’ utilities are normalized to zero when disagreement occurs. Then, the Nash bargaining solution in the first stage is determined by solving the following optimization problem$^9$:

$$\max_w [U(w) - 0] \cdot [u(w) - 0] = U(w) \cdot u(w) \tag{6.5}$$

The following proposition summarizes our analysis.

**Proposition 8** When the manufacturer and the fair-minded retailer bargain over the wholesale price in the channel, the wholesale price will be set at $w^* = \frac{a+bc+2b\gamma c}{2\delta(1+\gamma)}$ for $\alpha \geq \beta$ and $\beta \geq \frac{1}{1+\gamma}$.

This wholesale price coordinates the channel, with the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s payoffs respectively given by $\Pi^* = U^* = \frac{(a-bc)^2}{4\delta(1+\gamma)}$ and $\pi^* = u^* = \frac{(a-bc)^2\gamma}{4\delta(1+\gamma)}$.

Proofs for Proposition 8 are provided in Technical Appendix D. Note that the bargaining solution yields the same payoffs to both channel members as in our basic model (see Proposition 1). This should not come as a surprise, as the channel is coordinated only when the retailer gets its equitable payoff and the equitable payoff for the retailer is the same in both cases. What is different here is the range of parameters in which the fair channel can be coordinated. With bargaining, the range is wider$^{10}$, suggesting that channel coordination is more likely to happen with bargaining than with the manufacturer dictating the wholesale price.

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$^9$This setup implicitly assumes that both channel members have the same bargaining power.

$^{10}$The range for our basic model is given by $\alpha \geq \max \left( \frac{1}{1+\alpha}, \beta \right)$ and $\beta \geq \frac{1}{1+\gamma}$ as shown in Proposition 1.
7 Conclusion

In this paper, we take an initial step to incorporate fairness concerns into the theoretical literature on channel coordination. Past studies in behavioral economics and in marketing have shown that fairness is an important norm that motivates and regulates channel relationships in some cases, and that fairness concerns on the part of practitioners from time to time shape and govern their on-going channel interactions. Therefore, it is important for theoretical research on channel coordination to investigate fairness concerns and to explore their implications for designing a channel coordination mechanism. Our analysis shows that fairness can alter channel interactions and relationships in four ways.

First, because of the retailer’s concerns for fairness, the problem of double marginalization need not always be present in a channel. Said differently, fairness concerns open up more ways to coordinate the conventional channel and a constant wholesale price can also do the job.

Second, the mechanism through which a specific pricing contract coordinates the conventional channel in the presence of fairness concerns is quite different from that in their absence. With fairness concerns, the retailer has an incentive to effect an equitable outcome based on which channel coordination can be achieved through a constant wholesale price. In the case of a nonlinear pricing mechanism, the manufacturer must heed the retailer’s incentive to distort its price out of fairness concerns.

Third, with fairness concerns, the manufacturer is not in a position to claim all channel profits, even as the initiator of channel coordination who cares only about monetary payoffs. Indeed, as our analysis has shown, the monetary payoffs to the retailer can be higher than to the manufacturer, even when a nonlinear pricing contract is used. Therefore, the division of channel profits will depend not only on whether the channel is coordinated, but also on what constitute an equitable payoff to the retailer and how averse the retailer is to inequity. The latter two factors add two new dimensions to channel management and can significantly expand the scope of future theoretical
research on channel coordination.

Fourth, fairness concerns do not always bring an equitable outcome in a channel, as part of a firm’s objective is to maximize its monetary payoffs. Indeed, our analysis shows that an equitable channel relationship is an exception rather than a norm, especially when all channel members are fair-minded. In a coordinated channel, the manufacturer may suffer from either advantageous or disadvantageous inequality, while the retailer suffers from disadvantageous inequality. Our normative analysis puts in perspective the frictions and conflicts commonly observed in the channel context—perhaps they are all the necessary evil associated with pursuing the maximum channel profit!

While we believe that our analysis has generated some significant new insights, it is important to point out some important limitations of our model that future research can investigate further. First, we take it for granted that the concerns with fairness displayed by a firm’s managers are an “automated,” non-strategic behavior. Recent research in neuroeconomics has provided some initial support for this view. Researchers have recently found, through functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), that “when people feel they’re been treated unfairly, a small area called the anterior insula lights up, engendering the same disgust that people get from, say, smelling a skunk,” while the prefrontal cortex lights up when “people rationally weigh pros and cons” (BusinessWeek, 2005; and Camerer, et al, 2005). However, it can be quite fruitful to look into the process through which such fairness concerns may be formed and manifested in a channel context. Presumably, repeated interactions, which we do not model here, may be conducive to their formation, through punishing any opportunistic behavior.

Second, in our analysis, we take as exogenous the equitable payoffs for each channel member. We show that what is considered equitable and what is not can have a significant impact on the division of channel profits. However, we cannot determine in our model how such equitable payoffs are formed and accepted in a channel context. Therefore, it is important for future research to
investigate that question. Of course, broadly speaking, it is still an open question in behavior economics as to how an “anchoring” point or “reference” point is formed in general or even in a specific decision-making process.

Third, we do not look into how imperfect information may affect channel interactions in the presence of fairness concerns. Potentially, this is a very fruitful area for future research. Fourth, we analyzed a simple dyadic channel. More research is required to explore the implications of fairness in different channel structures. Finally, our analysis focuses on the implications of fairness concerns by channel players on channel coordination. For that reason, we do not model consumer fairness concerns about price changes motivated by either “fair reasons” (cost factors) or “unfair reasons” (Bolton, Warlop and Alba 2003). Future research can incorporate consumer fairness concerns to explore their implications for channel coordination. We suspect that since the cost to the retailer is the wholesale price from the manufacturer, the double marginalization problem could become worse, once incorporating consumer fairness concerns, as the retailer would have a greater flexibility in marking up on the wholesale price due to the consumer fairness concerns. However, our conclusion should not be qualitatively affected. As we have shown, within a certain wholesale price range, the retailer always wants to achieve the equitable outcome and it does so by setting \( p(w) = w + \gamma(w - c) \). What this means is that the retailer’s price will only depend on the retailer’s cost—the manufacturer’s wholesale price. Therefore, the introduction of consumer fairness concerns may not affect our conclusions qualitatively.

Notwithstanding those limitations, we hope that this initial step we have taken will sparkle more interest in pursuing this exciting line of research in the future.
Appendix A

Proof of Manufacturer’s Decisions for Constant Wholesale Price. When the manufacturer sets a wholesale price \( w \), the retailer will choose \( p(w) \) as in equation (2.12). If the manufacturer chooses a wholesale price from range \( w \leq w_2 \), then the manufacturer’s optimization problem is given by

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{max}_w & \quad (w - c)(a - bp), \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad \begin{cases}
p = \frac{a + bw}{2b} - \frac{\beta_2(w-c)}{2(1-\beta)} \\
w \leq w_2
\end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]  

(A1)

(A2)

The optimal wholesale price and the manufacturer’s profit are given below\(^\text{11}\)

\[
w = \begin{cases} 
\bar{w}_I & \text{if } 0 < \beta \leq \frac{1-2\gamma}{1+\gamma} \\
w_2 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\quad \text{and} \quad \Pi = \begin{cases} 
\frac{(a-bc)^2(1-\beta)}{8b(1-\beta-\beta_2)} & \text{if } 0 < \beta \leq \frac{1-2\gamma}{1+\gamma} \\
\frac{(a-bc)^2(1-\beta_2)}{4b(1-\beta-\beta_2+2\gamma)} & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

(A3)

where \( \bar{w}_I = \frac{(a+bc)(1-\beta)-2b\gamma c}{2b(1-\beta-\beta_2)} \).

If the manufacturer chooses a wholesale price from range \( w_2 < w \leq w_1 \), then the manufacturer’s optimization problem is given by

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{max}_w & \quad (w - c)(a - bp), \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad \begin{cases}
p = w + \gamma(w-c) \\
w > w_2 \\
w \leq w_1
\end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

(A4)

(A5)

The optimal wholesale price and the manufacturer’s profit are given below

\[
w = \begin{cases} 
w_2 & \text{if } 0 < \beta \leq \frac{1}{1+\gamma} \\
\bar{w}_{II} & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\quad \text{and} \quad \Pi = \begin{cases} 
\frac{(a-bc)^2(1-\beta)}{8b(1-\beta-\beta_2)} & \text{if } 0 < \beta \leq \frac{1}{1+\gamma} \\
\frac{(a-bc)^2}{4b(1+\gamma)} & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

(A6)

where \( \bar{w}_{II} = \frac{a+bc+2b\gamma c}{2b(1+\gamma)} \).

If the manufacturer chooses a wholesale price from range \( w > w_1 \), then the manufacturer’s optimization problem is given by

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{max}_w & \quad (w - c)(a - bp), \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad \begin{cases}
p = \frac{a + bw}{2b} + \frac{\alpha_2(w-c)}{2(1+a)} \\
w > w_1
\end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

(A7)

(A8)

\(^{11}\)Note equation A1 is not concave for some parametric values.
The optimal wholesale price and the manufacturer’s profit are given by
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{if } 0 < \alpha &\leq \frac{2\gamma - 1}{1 + \gamma} \\
\text{otherwise } &\text{ } \\
\end{align*}
\]
and
\[
\Pi = \begin{cases} 
\frac{(a - bc)(1 + \alpha)}{8(1 + \alpha + \alpha \gamma)} & \text{if } 0 < \alpha \leq \frac{2\gamma - 1}{1 + \gamma} \\
\frac{(a - bc)^2(1 + \alpha)\gamma}{6(1 + \alpha + \alpha \gamma)^2} & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]
where \( \bar{w}_{III} = \frac{(a + bc)(1 + \alpha) + 2abc}{2b(1 + \alpha + \alpha \gamma)} \).

Therefore, the manufacturer will compare the resulting payoffs to determine the globally optimal payoff. The globally optimal wholesale price and profits are given by
\[
\begin{align*}
w^* &= \bar{w}, \text{ } \Pi^* = \begin{cases} 
\frac{(a - bc)^2(1 - \beta)}{8b(1 - \beta - \beta \gamma)} & \text{if } 0 < \beta \leq \frac{1 - 2\gamma}{1 + \gamma} \text{ and } \alpha \geq \beta \\
\frac{(a - bc)^2(1 + \alpha)}{8b(1 + \alpha + \alpha \gamma)} & \text{if } 1 - 2\gamma < \beta < \frac{1}{1 + \gamma} \text{ and } \beta \leq \alpha < \bar{\alpha} \\
\frac{(a - bc)^2(1 - \beta^2)}{6b(1 - \beta - \beta \gamma + 2\gamma \alpha)} & \text{if } 1 - 2\gamma < \beta < \frac{1}{1 + \gamma} \text{ and } \alpha \geq \max\{\bar{\alpha}, \beta\} \\
\frac{(a - bc)^2(1 + \alpha)}{8b(1 + \alpha + \alpha \gamma)} & \text{if } \beta = \frac{1}{1 + \gamma} \text{ and } \beta \leq \alpha < \frac{2\gamma - 1}{1 + \gamma} \\
\frac{(a - bc)^2(1 + \alpha)}{8b(1 + \alpha + \alpha \gamma)} & \text{if } \beta = \frac{1}{1 + \gamma} \text{ and } \alpha \geq \max\{\frac{\gamma - 1}{1 + \gamma}, \beta\} \\
\frac{(a - bc)^2(1 + \alpha)}{8b(1 + \alpha + \alpha \gamma)} & \text{if } \beta = \frac{1}{1 + \gamma} \text{ and } \alpha \geq \max\{\frac{\gamma - 1}{1 + \gamma}, \beta\} \\
\end{cases}
\]
where \( \bar{\alpha} = \frac{(1 - \beta - \beta \gamma - 2\gamma)^2 - 8\beta^2}{8\gamma^2 - (1 - \beta - \beta \gamma - 2\gamma)^2} \). It is straightforward to calculate the retailer’s utility and profits, given equations (A10) and (2.12). Furthermore, the retail price equals the channel coordinating retail price \( p = p^* = \frac{a + bc}{2b} \) in the fifth and seventh cases in equation (A10), i.e., \( \beta \geq \frac{1}{1 + \gamma} \) and \( \alpha \geq \max\{\frac{\gamma - 1}{1 + \gamma}, \beta\} \). In both cases the retailer’s utility and profit are given by \( \pi^* = u^* = \frac{(a - bc)^2\gamma}{4b(1 + \gamma)} \).

**Appendix B**

**Proof of Retailer’s Decisions for Two-Part Tariff.** The analysis of the retailer’s decisions proceeds in three steps. 1). We determine the retail price and the retailer’s utility when it has disadvantageous inequality, i.e., when the retailer’s profit is lower than its equitable profit \( \gamma \Pi \). 2). We determine the retail price and utility when the retailer has advantageous inequality. 3). We compare the resulting utility to determine the optimal retail price and utility for the retailer.

**Disadvantageous Inequality.** The retailer has disutility from disadvantageous inequality if the retailer chooses a retail price such that its profit is not higher than its equitable profit, i.e.,
\[
\pi(w, F, p) - \gamma \Pi(w, F, p) = (p - w)(a - bp) - F - \gamma[(w - c)(a - bp) + F] \leq 0.
\]
This is equivalent to \( \phi(p) = bp^2 - [a + bw + b\gamma(w - c)]p + aw + a\gamma w - a\gamma c + (1 + \gamma)F \geq 0 \). Therefore, the retailer’s
The optimal retail price and the maximum utility for the retailer, conditional on disadvantageous inequality, are given below

\[
\begin{aligned}
p &= \begin{cases} 
\bar{p}_1 & \text{if } \Delta < \frac{1}{(1+\alpha)^2}b^2\gamma^2(w - c)^2 \\
\hat{p}_1 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases} \\
u &= \begin{cases} 
u(\bar{p}_1) & \text{if } \Delta < \frac{1}{(1+\alpha)^2}b^2\gamma^2(w - c)^2 \\
u(\hat{p}_1) & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\end{aligned}
\]

where \( \bar{p}_1 = \frac{a+bw}{2b} + \frac{\alpha(w-c)}{2(1+\alpha)}, \hat{p}_1 = \frac{a+bw+b\gamma(w-c)-\sqrt{\Delta}}{2b}, \) and \( \Delta = [a-bw-b\gamma(w-c)]^2 - 4b(1+\gamma)F. \)

**Advantageous Inequality.** The retailer has disutility from advantageous inequality if the retailer chooses \( p \) such that \( \pi(w, F, p) - \gamma\Pi(w, F, p) \geq 0 \), or \( \phi(p) \leq 0 \) where \( \phi(p) \) is same as in disadvantageous inequality section above. Therefore, the retailer’s optimization problem, conditional on advantageous inequality, is given by

\[
\begin{aligned}
\max_p & \quad u(p) = (p-w)(a-bp) - F - \beta[(p-w)(a-bp) - F] - \gamma[(w-c)(a-bp) + F] \quad \text{(B4)} \\
s.t. & \quad \phi(p) \leq 0
\end{aligned}
\]

The optimal retail price and the maximum utility for the retailer, conditional on advantageous inequality, are given below

\[
\begin{aligned}
p &= \begin{cases} 
\tilde{p}_1 & \text{if } 0 \leq \Delta \leq \frac{1}{(1-\beta)^2}b^2\gamma^2(w - c)^2 \\
\tilde{p}_2 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases} \\
u &= \begin{cases} 
u(\tilde{p}_1) & \text{if } 0 \leq \Delta \leq \frac{1}{(1-\beta)^2}b^2\gamma^2(w - c)^2 \\
u(\tilde{p}_2) & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\end{aligned}
\]

where \( \tilde{p}_1 = \frac{a+bw}{2b} - \frac{\beta\gamma\gamma(w-c)}{2(1-\beta)}, \) and both \( \tilde{p}_1 \) and \( \Delta \) are same as in disadvantageous inequality section.

The retailer’s optimal decision will depend on whether its utility \( u \) in equation (B3) is larger than that in equation (B6). From equations (B3) and (B6), we can show that the retailer’s optimal price and utility are given by

\[
\begin{aligned}
\begin{cases} 
p(w, F) = \bar{p}_1, u(w, F) = u(\bar{p}_1) & \text{if } \Delta < \frac{1}{(1+\alpha)^2}b^2\gamma^2(w - c)^2 \\
p(w, F) = \hat{p}_1, u(w, F) = u(\hat{p}_1) & \text{if } \frac{1}{(1+\alpha)^2}b^2\gamma^2(w - c)^2 \leq \Delta \leq \frac{1}{(1-\beta)^2}b^2\gamma^2(w - c)^2 \\
p(w, F) = \tilde{p}_2, u(w, F) = u(\tilde{p}_2) & \text{if } \Delta > \frac{1}{(1-\beta)^2}b^2\gamma^2(w - c)^2
\end{cases}
\end{aligned}
\]
Proof of Manufacturer’s Decisions for Two-Part Tariff. Given the retailer’s price \( p(w, F) \), the manufacturer will determine its optimal two-part tariff \((w, F)\) through the comparison of resulting payoffs for the three ranges of \( \Delta \) in equation (B7). We first derive the manufacturer’s optimal \((w, F)\) and compute its maximum payoff conditional on \( \Delta < \frac{1}{(1+\alpha)\gamma}b^2\gamma^2(w - c)^2 \), then we show that such payoff will always be larger than that in each of the other two ranges. That is, the manufacturer will always prefer to choose \((w, F)\) such that \( \Delta < \frac{1}{(1+\alpha)\gamma}b^2\gamma^2(w - c)^2 \).

If the manufacturer chooses \( \Delta < \frac{1}{(1+\alpha)\gamma}b^2\gamma^2(w - c)^2 \), then its optimization problem is given below

\[
\max_{w,F} \quad \Pi(w, F) = (w - c)(a - bp) + F, \tag{B8}
\]

\[
\text{s.t.} \quad \begin{align*}
  u(p) &\geq 0 \\
  p &= \bar{p}_1 \\
  \Delta &< \frac{1}{(1+\alpha)\gamma}b^2\gamma^2(w - c)^2
\end{align*} \tag{B9}
\]

Since \( \Pi(w, F) \) is increasing in \( F \) and the retailer’s price \( \bar{p}_1 \) is independent of \( F \), the manufacturer will choose the highest \( F \) while keeping the retailer a willing participant of the channel and then choose the optimal \( w \) to maximize its payoff. It is straightforward to show that such a fixed payment is given by

\[
F^* = \frac{(\bar{p}_1 - w)(a - bp_1)(1+\alpha - \alpha\gamma(a - bp_1)(w - c))}{1+\alpha + \alpha\gamma}. \tag{B10}
\]

The optimal \((w, F)\) and the manufacturer’s payoff are therefore given by

\[
\begin{align*}
  w^* &= c \\
  F^* &= \frac{(a - bc)(1+\alpha)}{4b(1+\alpha + \alpha\gamma)} \\
  \Pi^* &= \frac{(a - bc)^2(1+\alpha)}{4b(1+\alpha + \alpha\gamma)}
\end{align*}
\]

Notice that when the manufacturer chooses \((w, F)\) as in equation (B10), the retail price equals the channel coordinating price \( p = \bar{p}_1 = \frac{a+bc}{2b} = p^* \). Therefore the channel profit in this scenario is equal to the maximum channel profit \( \Pi^* \). Since the retailer has disadvantageous inequality for \( \Delta < \frac{1}{(1+\alpha)\gamma}b^2\gamma^2(w - c)^2 \), i.e., \( \gamma\Pi > \pi \), the manufacturer’s payoff satisfies \( \Pi > \frac{1}{1+\gamma}\Pi^* \). If the manufacturer chooses a two-part tariff \((w, F)\) such that \( \Delta \geq \frac{1}{(1+\alpha)\gamma}b^2\gamma^2(w - c)^2 \), the retailer will have either no inequality or advantageous inequality. That is, \( \gamma\Pi \leq \pi \), or \( \Pi \leq \frac{1}{1+\gamma}\Pi^* \leq \frac{1}{1+\gamma}\Pi^* \). The manufacturer will get strictly lower payoff by choosing \( \Delta \geq \frac{1}{(1+\alpha)\gamma}b^2\gamma^2(w - c)^2 \) than choosing
\( \Delta < \frac{1}{(1+\alpha)} b^2 \gamma^2 (w - c)^2. \) As a result, the manufacturer’s optimal two-part tariff and payoff are given by equation (B10).
References


Only the Stackelberg Manufacturer is Fair-minded

When the manufacturer sets a wholesale price \( w \), the non-fair-minded retailer will choose \( p(w) = \frac{a+bw}{2b} \) to maximize its monetary payoff.

If the manufacturer chooses a wholesale price from range \( w \leq \frac{\alpha_0+2bc}{b(\mu+2)} = w_3 \) such that \( \Pi - \mu \pi \leq 0 \), then the manufacturer has disutility from disadvantageous inequality and its optimization problem is given by

\[
\max_w U(w) = (w - c)(a - bp) - \alpha_0[\mu(p - w) - (w - c))(a - bp), \quad (C1)
\]
\[s.t.\quad \begin{cases}
p = \frac{a+bw}{2b} \\
w \leq w_3
\end{cases}\quad (C2)
\]

The optimal wholesale price is given below

\[
w = \begin{cases}
\tilde{w}_{IV} & \text{if } 0 \leq \alpha_0 \leq \frac{\mu-2}{\mu+2} \\
w_3 & \text{if } \alpha_0 > \frac{\mu-2}{\mu+2}
\end{cases}\quad (C3)
\]

where \( \tilde{w}_{IV} = \frac{a+bc+\alpha_0\mu+2\alpha_0}{b(2+\alpha_0\mu+2\alpha_0)} \), and the optimal retail price is given by \( p(w) = \frac{a+bw}{2b} \). Manufacturer’s and retailer’s utility and profits are given below

\[
U = \begin{cases}
\frac{(1+\alpha_0)^2(a-bc)^2}{b(2+\alpha_0\mu+2\alpha_0)^2} & \text{if } 0 \leq \alpha_0 \leq \frac{\mu-2}{\mu+2} \\
\frac{\mu(a-bc)^2}{b(\mu+2)^2} & \text{if } \alpha_0 > \frac{\mu-2}{\mu+2}
\end{cases}\quad (C4)
\]
\[
\Pi = \begin{cases}
\frac{(1+\alpha_0)(1+\alpha_0\mu+2\alpha_0)(a-bc)^2}{2b(2+\alpha_0\mu+2\alpha_0)^2} & \text{if } 0 \leq \alpha_0 \leq \frac{\mu-2}{\mu+2} \\
\frac{\mu(a-bc)^2}{b(\mu+2)^2} & \text{if } \alpha_0 > \frac{\mu-2}{\mu+2}
\end{cases}\quad (C5)
\]
\[
u = \pi = \begin{cases}
\frac{(1+\alpha_0)^2(a-bc)^2}{4b(2+\alpha_0\mu+2\alpha_0)^2} & \text{if } 0 \leq \alpha_0 \leq \frac{\mu-2}{\mu+2} \\
\frac{(a-bc)^2}{b(\mu+2)^2} & \text{if } \alpha_0 > \frac{\mu-2}{\mu+2}
\end{cases}\quad (C6)
\]

If the manufacturer chooses a wholesale price from range \( w \geq w_3 \) such that \( \mu \pi - \Pi \leq 0 \), then the manufacturer has disutility from advantageous inequality and its optimization problem is given
by

$$\max_w \quad U(w) = (w - c)(a - bp) - \beta_0[(w - c) - \mu(p - w)](a - bp),$$  \hfill (C7)

s.t. \begin{align*}
p &= \frac{a + bw}{2b} \\
w &\geq w_3
\end{align*} \hfill (C8)

The optimal wholesale price is given below\(^\text{12}\)

$$w = \begin{cases} w_V \quad \text{if } 0 \leq \beta_0 \leq \frac{2-\mu}{\mu+2} \\
w_3 \quad \text{if } \beta_0 > \frac{2-\mu}{\mu+2}
\end{cases} \hfill (C9)$$

where \(w_V = \frac{a+bc-a\beta_0\mu-a\beta_3-a\beta_0bc}{b(2-\beta_0\mu-2\beta_0)},\) and the optimal retail price is given by \(p(w) = \frac{a+bw}{2b}.\) Manufacturer’s and retailer’s utility and profits are given below

$$U = \begin{cases} \frac{(1-\beta_0)^2(a-bc)^2}{4b^2(2-\beta_0\mu-2\beta_0)} & \text{if } 0 \leq \beta_0 \leq \frac{2-\mu}{\mu+2} \\
\mu(a-bc)^2 & \text{if } \beta_0 > \frac{2-\mu}{\mu+2}
\end{cases} \hfill (C10)$$

$$II = \begin{cases} \frac{(1-\beta_0)(1-\beta_0\mu-a\beta_3-a\beta_0bc)}{2b^2(2-\beta_0\mu-2\beta_0)^2} & \text{if } 0 \leq \beta_0 \leq \frac{2-\mu}{\mu+2} \\
\mu(a-bc)^2 & \text{if } \beta_0 > \frac{2-\mu}{\mu+2}
\end{cases} \hfill (C11)$$

$$u = \pi = \begin{cases} \frac{(1-\beta_0)(1-\beta_0\mu-a\beta_3-a\beta_0bc)}{4b^2(2-\beta_0\mu-2\beta_0)^2} & \text{if } 0 \leq \beta_0 \leq \frac{2-\mu}{\mu+2} \\
\frac{\mu(a-bc)^2}{b(\mu+2)^2} & \text{if } \beta_0 > \frac{2-\mu}{\mu+2}
\end{cases} \hfill (C12)$$

Therefore, the manufacturer will compare the resulting utility to determine the globally optimal solution. The globally optimal wholesale price and utility are given by

$$\begin{align*}
w^* &= w_V, \quad U^* = \frac{(a-bc)^2(1-\beta_0)^2}{4b^2(2-\beta_0\mu-2\beta_0)} & \text{if } 0 \leq \beta_0 \leq \frac{2-\mu}{2+\mu} \\
w^* &= w_V, \quad U^* = \frac{(a-bc)^2(1+\alpha_0)^2}{4b^2(2-\beta_0\mu-2\beta_0)\alpha_0} & \text{if } \frac{2-\mu}{2+\mu} < \beta_0 < 1 \text{ and } 0 \leq \alpha_0 \leq \frac{\mu-2}{\mu+2} , \\
w^* &= w_3, \quad U^* = \frac{\mu(a-bc)^2}{b(\mu+2)^2} & \text{if } \frac{2-\mu}{\mu+2} < \beta_0 < 1 \text{ and } \alpha_0 > \frac{\mu-2}{\mu+2}
\end{align*} \hfill (C13)$$

and the retail price is given by

$$\begin{align*}
p &= \frac{(1-\beta_0)(3a+bc)-2a\beta_0\mu}{2b^2(2-\beta_0\mu-2\beta_0)} & \text{if } 0 \leq \beta_0 \leq \frac{2-\mu}{2+\mu} \\
p &= \frac{(1+\alpha_0)(3a+bc)+2a\mu}{2b^2(2+2\alpha_0+\alpha_0\mu)} & \text{if } \frac{2-\mu}{2+\mu} < \beta_0 < 2 \text{ and } 0 \leq \alpha_0 \leq \frac{\mu-2}{\mu+2} , \\
p &= \frac{a+bc-a\mu}{b(2\mu)} & \text{if } \frac{2-\mu}{\mu+2} < \beta_0 < 1 \text{ and } \alpha_0 > \frac{\mu-2}{\mu+2}
\end{align*} \hfill (C14)$$

This is summarized in Table 2.\(^\text{12}\)

\(^{12}\)Note that the manufacturer’s utility function is not concave in wholesale price \(w\) for \(\beta_0 > \frac{2}{\mu+2}\) but it can be shown that \(w = w_3\) is still the optimal wholesale price.
It is straightforward to calculate the manufacturer’s and retailer’s profits, given equations (C13) and \( p(w) = \frac{a + bw}{2b} \). In the benchmark case in which there is no fairness concern between channel members, the retail price is given by \( \tilde{p} = \frac{3a + bc}{4b} \). It is easy to show that the equilibrium retail price \( p \) will be always higher than the channel coordinating retail price \( p^* = \frac{a + bc}{2b} \) and, more interestingly, will be higher than the benchmark retail price \( \tilde{p} \) for any \( \mu > 2 \). For any \( \mu \leq 2 \), we have \( p^* < p \leq \tilde{p} \).

**Fair Minded Manufacturer and Retailer with Single Wholesale Price \( w \)**

We first check whether manufacturer’s concern of fairness could change the channel coordination conditions in single wholesale price regime, and, if yes, how. Since the retailer makes decisions solely based on wholesale price \( w \), given \( w \) the retailer’s decisions are still given by

\[
p(w) = \begin{cases} 
\tilde{p}_2 = \frac{a + bw}{2b} - \frac{\beta \gamma (w - c)}{2(1 - \beta)} & \text{if } w \leq w_2 \\
p_0 = w + \gamma (w - c) & \text{if } w_2 < w \leq w_1 \\
\tilde{p}_1 = \frac{a + bw}{2b} + \frac{\alpha \gamma (w - c)}{2(1 + \alpha)} & \text{if } w > w_1
\end{cases}
\]  

(C15)

which is same as equation (2.12).

Proposition 1 shows that the players will choose the channel-coordinating actions for \( \beta \geq \frac{1}{1 + \gamma} \) and \( \alpha \geq \max\{\frac{\gamma - 1}{1 + \gamma}, \beta\} \) when only the retailer cares about fairness, i.e., \( \alpha_0 = \beta_0 = 0 \). More specifically, the manufacturer will choose \( w = w_2 = \frac{a - \alpha \beta - \beta \gamma c + 2\beta c}{b(1 - \beta - \beta \gamma + 2\gamma)} \) for \( \beta = \frac{1}{1 + \gamma} \) and \( \alpha \geq \max\{\frac{\gamma - 1}{1 + \gamma}, \beta\} \) and choose \( w = w_{II} = \frac{a + bc + 2bc}{2b(1 + \gamma)} \) for \( \beta > \frac{1}{1 + \gamma} \) and \( \alpha \geq \max\{\frac{\gamma - 1}{1 + \gamma}, \beta\} \), and the retailer will choose \( p = p^* \).
We will check whether the current wholesale price is still optimal for the manufacturer when the manufacturer cares about fairness.

(a) \( \beta = \frac{1}{1+\gamma} \) and \( \alpha \geq \max\{\frac{\gamma-1}{1+\gamma}, \beta\} \).

When \( \beta = \frac{1}{1+\gamma} \) and \( \alpha \geq \max\{\frac{\gamma-1}{1+\gamma}, \beta\} \), the manufacturer will choose \( w = w_2 \) in the scenario of \( w \leq w_2 \) if it does not care about fairness and the retailer will choose \( p = \bar{p}_2 \) as shown in equation (2.12). At the point of \( w = w_2 = \frac{a - a\beta - \beta \gamma c + 2bc}{b(1 - \beta - \beta^2 \gamma + \gamma)} = \frac{a + bc + 2bc \gamma}{2b(1 + \gamma)} \), we have

\[
\mu(\bar{p}_2 - w) - (w - c) = \frac{(a - bc)(\gamma - 1)}{2b(1 + \gamma)} \begin{cases} 
> 0 & \text{if } \gamma > 1 \\
\leq 0 & \text{if } \gamma \leq 1 
\end{cases} \tag{C16}
\]

Case 1. Acrimonious channel: \( \mu \gamma > 1 \). In an acrimonious channel, the manufacturer’s utility is given by

\[
U(w) = (w - c)(a - b\bar{p}_2) - \alpha_0[\mu(\bar{p}_2 - w) - (w - c)](a - b\bar{p}_2) \tag{C17}
\]

and we have

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{dU}{dw} &= \frac{(a - bc)}{2}(1 + \alpha_0 + \alpha_0 \mu) > 0 \\
\frac{d^2U}{dw^2} &= 0
\end{align*} \tag{C18}
\]

Since \( w \leq w_2 \), the manufacturer will still choose \( w = w_2 \) if \( w_2 \) provides it with non-negative utility.

Its utility by choosing \( w = w_2 \) is given below

\[
U(w = w_2) = \frac{(a - bc)^2(1 + \alpha_0 - \alpha_0 \mu)}{4b(1 + \gamma)} \begin{cases} 
\geq 0 & \text{if } \alpha_0 \leq \frac{1}{\mu^\gamma - 1} \\
< 0 & \text{if } \alpha_0 > \frac{1}{\mu^\gamma - 1} 
\end{cases} \tag{C19}
\]

Case 2. Harmonious channel: \( \mu \gamma \leq 1 \). In a harmonious channel, the manufacturer’s utility is given by

\[
U(w) = (w - c)(a - b\bar{p}_2) - \beta_0[(w - c) - \mu(\bar{p}_2 - w)](a - b\bar{p}_2) \tag{C20}
\]
and we have

\[
\begin{aligned}
\frac{dU}{dw} &= \frac{(a-bc)}{2}(1 - \beta_0 - \beta_0 \mu) \\
\frac{d^2U}{dw^2} &= 0
\end{aligned}
\]  

(C21)

Since \(w \leq w_2\), the manufacturer will choose \(w\) as follows

\[
w = \begin{cases} 
    w_2 & \text{if } \beta_0 \leq \frac{1}{1+\mu} \\
    < w_2 & \text{if } \beta_0 > \frac{1}{1+\mu}
\end{cases}
\]

(C22)

and its utility is given by

\[
U(w = w_2) = \begin{cases} 
    \frac{(a-bc)^2(1-\beta_0+\beta_0 \mu \gamma)}{4b(1+\gamma)} & \text{if } \beta_0 \leq \frac{1}{1+\mu} \\
    > & \text{if } \beta_0 > \frac{1}{1+\mu}
\end{cases}
\]

(C23)

Since \(w = w_2\) is a corner solution for \(w \leq w_2\) when \(\beta = \frac{1}{1+\gamma}\) and \(\alpha \geq \max\{\frac{\gamma-1}{1+\gamma}, \beta\}\), we also need to check whether \(w = w_2\) is a stable solution within the \(w_2 < w \leq w_1\) regime. When the manufacturer chooses a close to \(w_2\) wholesale price in the scenario of \(w_2 < w \leq w_1\), the retailer will choose \(p = p_0 = w + \gamma(w - c)\) as shown in equation (C15). At the point of \(w = w_2 = \frac{a-\alpha \beta \gamma c + 2bc}{b(1-\beta - \beta \gamma + 2\gamma)} = \frac{a+bc+2bc}{2b(1+\gamma)}\), we have

\[
\mu(p_0 - w_2) - (w_2 - c) = (\mu \gamma - 1)(w_2 - c) \begin{cases} 
    > 0 & \text{if } \mu \gamma > 1 \\
    \leq 0 & \text{if } \mu \gamma \leq 1
\end{cases}
\]

(C24)

**Case 1’. Acrimonious channel: \(\mu \gamma > 1\).** In an acrimonious channel, the manufacturer’s utility is given by

\[
U(w) = (w - c)(a - bp_0) - \alpha_0(\mu \gamma - 1)(w - c)(a - bp_0)
\]

(C25)

and we have

\[
\begin{aligned}
\frac{dU}{dw} &= (1 + \alpha_0 - \alpha_0 \mu \gamma)(a + bc - 2bw - 2b \gamma w + 2b \gamma c) \\
\frac{d^2U}{dw^2} &= -2b(1 + \gamma)(1 + \alpha_0 - \alpha_0 \mu \gamma)
\end{aligned}
\]

(C26)

Since \(w_2 < w \leq w_1\), the manufacturer will choose \(w\) as follows

\[
w = \begin{cases} 
    w_2 & \text{if } \alpha_0 \leq \frac{1}{\mu \gamma - 1} \\
    > w_2 & \text{if } \alpha_0 > \frac{1}{\mu \gamma - 1}
\end{cases}
\]

(C27)
and its utility is given by

\[ U(w = w_2) = \begin{cases} \frac{(a-bc)^2(1+\alpha_0-\alpha_0\mu\gamma)}{4b(1+\gamma)} & \text{if } \alpha_0 \leq \frac{1}{\mu\gamma-1} \\ \frac{(a-bc)^2(1+\alpha_0-\alpha_0\mu\gamma)}{4b(1+\gamma)} & \text{if } \alpha_0 > \frac{1}{\mu\gamma-1} \end{cases} \]  

(C28)

*Case 2’. Harmonious channel: \( \mu\gamma \leq 1 \). In a harmonious channel, the manufacturer’s utility is given by

\[ U(w) = (w-c)(a-bp_0) - \beta_0[(w-c) - \mu(p_0-w)](a-bp_0) \]  

(C29)

and we have

\[ \begin{aligned} \frac{dU}{dw} &= (1 - \beta_0 + \beta_0\mu\gamma)(a + bc - 2bw - 2b\gamma w + 2b\gamma c) \\ \frac{d^2U}{dw^2} &= -2b(1 + \gamma)(1 - \beta_0 + \beta_0\mu\gamma) < 0 \end{aligned} \]  

(C30)

Since \( w_2 < w \leq w_1 \), the manufacturer will choose \( w = w_2 \) and its utility is given by

\[ U = \frac{(a-bc)^2(1 - \beta_0 + \beta_0\mu\gamma)}{4b(1+\gamma)} > 0 \]  

(C31)

From Cases 1, 2 and Cases 1’, 2’, we could have the following conclusion for \( \beta = \frac{1}{1+\gamma} \) and \( \alpha \geq \max\{\frac{\gamma-1}{1+\gamma}, \beta\} \).

(i). If \( \mu\gamma - 1 > 0 \), then

\[ \begin{cases} w^* = w_2, \ p = p^*, \ U^* = \frac{(a-bc)^2(1+\alpha_0-\alpha_0\mu\gamma)}{4b(1+\gamma)} & \text{if } \alpha_0 \leq \frac{1}{\mu\gamma-1} \\ w^* > w_2, \ p > p^*, \ U^* > \frac{(a-bc)^2(1+\alpha_0-\alpha_0\mu\gamma)}{4b(1+\gamma)} & \text{if } \alpha_0 > \frac{1}{\mu\gamma-1} \end{cases} \]  

(C32)

(ii). If \( \mu\gamma - 1 = 0 \), then

\[ w^* = w_2, \ p = p^*, \ U^* = \frac{(a-bc)^2}{4b(1+\gamma)}. \]  

(C33)

(iii). If \( \mu\gamma - 1 < 0 \), then

\[ \begin{cases} w^* = w_2, \ p = p^*, \ U^* = \frac{(a-bc)^2(1-\beta_0+\beta_0\mu\gamma)}{4b(1+\gamma)} & \text{if } \beta_0 \leq \frac{1}{1+\mu} \\ w^* < w_2, \ p = p^*, \ U^* > \frac{(a-bc)^2(1-\beta_0+\beta_0\mu\gamma)}{4b(1+\gamma)} & \text{if } \beta_0 > \frac{1}{1+\mu} \end{cases} \]  

(C34)
(b) $\beta > \frac{1}{1+\gamma}$ and $\alpha \geq \max\{\frac{\gamma-1}{1+\gamma}, \beta\}$.

When $\beta > \frac{1}{1+\gamma}$ and $\alpha \geq \max\{\frac{\gamma-1}{1+\gamma}, \beta\}$, the manufacturer will choose $w = \bar{w}_II = \frac{a+bc+2b\gamma c}{2b(1+\gamma)}$ in the scenario of $w_2 < w \leq w_1$ if it does not care about fairness and the retailer will choose $p = p_0 = w + \gamma(w-c)$ as shown in equation (2.12). At the point of $w = \bar{w}_II = \frac{a+bc+2b\gamma c}{2b(1+\gamma)}$, we have

$$\mu(p_0 - w) - (w-c) = (\mu\gamma - 1)(w-c) \begin{cases} > 0 & \text{if } \mu\gamma > 1 \\ \leq 0 & \text{if } \mu\gamma \leq 1 \end{cases}$$

(C35)

Case 1. Acrimonious channel: $\mu\gamma > 1$. In an acrimonious channel, the manufacturer’s utility is given by

$$U(w) = (w-c)(a-bp_0) - \alpha_0(\mu\gamma - 1)(w-c)(a-bp_0)$$

(C36)

and we have

$$\frac{dU}{dw} = (1 + \alpha_0 - \alpha_0\mu\gamma)(a+bc - 2bw - 2b\gamma w + 2b\gamma c)$$

$$\frac{d^2U}{dw^2} = -2b(1+\gamma)(1 + \alpha_0 - \alpha_0\mu\gamma)$$

(C37)

The manufacturer will still choose $w = \bar{w}_II$ if $\bar{w}_II$ provides it with non-negative utility. Its utility by choosing $w = \bar{w}_II$ is given below

$$U(w = \bar{w}_II) = \frac{(a-bc)^2(1+\alpha_0 - \alpha_0\mu\gamma)}{4b(1+\gamma)} \begin{cases} \geq 0 & \text{if } \alpha_0 \leq \frac{1}{\mu\gamma-1} \\ < 0 & \text{if } \alpha_0 > \frac{1}{\mu\gamma-1} \end{cases}$$

(C38)

Case 2. Harmonious channel: $\mu\gamma \leq 1$. In a harmonious channel, the manufacturer’s utility is given by

$$U(w) = (w-c)(a-bp_0) - \beta_0(1-\mu\gamma)(w-c)(a-bp_0)$$

(C39)

and we have

$$\frac{dU}{dw} = (1 - \beta_0 + \beta_0\mu\gamma)(a+bc - 2bw - 2b\gamma w + 2b\gamma c)$$

$$\frac{d^2U}{dw^2} = -2b(1+\gamma)(1 - \beta_0 + \beta_0\mu\gamma) < 0$$

(C40)
The manufacturer’s utility by choosing \( w = \bar{w}_{II} \) is given by

\[
U(w = \bar{w}_{II}) = \frac{(a - bc)^2(1 - \beta_0 + \beta_0 \mu \gamma)}{4b(1 + \gamma)} > 0
\] (C41)

From Cases 1 and 2 above, we could have the following conclusion for \( \beta > \frac{1}{1+\gamma} \) and \( \alpha \geq \max\{\frac{1}{\mu_\gamma - 1}, \beta\} \).

(i). If \( \mu_\gamma - 1 > 0 \), then

\[
\begin{align*}
\begin{cases}
 w^* = \bar{w}_{II}, & p = p^*, \ U^* = \frac{(a - bc)^2(1 + \alpha - \alpha_0 \mu \gamma)}{4b(1 + \gamma)} \\
 w^* \neq \bar{w}_{II}, & p \neq p^*, \ U^* > \frac{(a - bc)^2(1 + \alpha - \alpha_0 \mu \gamma)}{4b(1 + \gamma)}
\end{cases}
\end{align*}
\] (C42)

(ii). If \( \mu_\gamma - 1 = 0 \), then

\[
w^* = \bar{w}_{II}, \ p = p^*, \ U^* = \frac{(a - bc)^2}{4b(1 + \gamma)}.\] (C43)

(iii). If \( \mu_\gamma - 1 < 0 \), then

\[
w^* = \bar{w}_{II}, \ p = p^*, \ U^* = \frac{(a - bc)^2(1 - \beta_0 + \beta_0 \mu \gamma)}{4b(1 + \gamma)}.\] (C44)

We can see that manufacturer’s concern for fairness will not affect the coordination of an acrimonious channel, unless the manufacturer is very averse to its own disadvantageous inequality. This leads to Proposition 6.

**Fair Minded Manufacturer and Retailer with Two-Part Tariff \((w, F)\)**

Again, the manufacturer’s inequity aversion parameters are given by \( \beta_0 \leq \alpha_0 \) and \( 0 \leq \beta_0 < 1 \).

Given manufacturer’s decisions \((w, F)\), the retailer will choose retail price \( p \) as follows

\[
p(w, F) = \begin{cases}
\hat{p}_1 = \frac{a + bw + \alpha \gamma (w - c)}{2b} & \text{if } \Delta < \frac{1}{(1+\alpha)^2}b^2 \gamma^2(w - c)^2 \\
\hat{p}_1 = \frac{a + bw + b\gamma (w - c) - \sqrt{\Delta}}{2b} & \text{if } \frac{1}{(1+\alpha)^2}b^2 \gamma^2(w - c)^2 \leq \Delta \leq \frac{1}{(1-\beta)^2}b^2 \gamma^2(w - c)^2 \\
\hat{p}_2 = \frac{a + bw - \beta \gamma (w - c)}{2b} & \text{if } \Delta > \frac{1}{(1-\beta)^2}b^2 \gamma^2(w - c)^2
\end{cases}
\] (C45)

where \( \Delta = [a - bw - b\gamma (w - c)]^2 - 4b(1 + \gamma)F \).
Proposition 3 shows that the manufacturer will choose \((w, F) = [c, \frac{(a-bc)(1+\alpha \gamma)}{4b(1+\alpha + \alpha \gamma)}]\) when it does not care about fairness. We would like to check whether the solution is still optimal when the manufacturer does have fairness concern.

At the current solution \([c, \frac{(a-bc)(1+\alpha \gamma)}{4b(1+\alpha + \alpha \gamma)}], \Delta < \frac{1}{(1+\alpha \gamma)} b^2 \gamma^2 (w - \bar{c})^2\) is satisfied, and we have

\[
\mu[(\bar{p}_1 - w)(a - b\bar{p}_1) - F] - [(w - c)(a - b\bar{p}_1) + F] = \frac{(a-bc)(\mu \gamma \alpha - 1 - \alpha)}{4b(1+\alpha + \alpha \gamma)} \begin{cases} 
> 0 & \text{if } \mu \gamma > 1 + \frac{1}{\alpha} \\
\leq 0 & \text{if } \mu \gamma \leq 1 + \frac{1}{\alpha} 
\end{cases}
\]

Case 1. Acrimonious channel: \(\mu \gamma > 1 + \frac{1}{\alpha}\). In an acrimonious channel, the manufacturer’s utility is given by

\[
U(w, F) = (w - c)(a - b\bar{p}_1) + F - \alpha_0[\mu(\bar{p}_1 - w)(a - b\bar{p}_1) - \mu F - (w - c)(a - b\bar{p}_1) - F] \quad (C46)
\]

The manufacturer chooses a fixed payment \(F = \frac{(\bar{p}_1 - w)(a - b\bar{p}_1)(1+\alpha)(a - b\bar{p}_1)(w - c)}{1+\alpha + \alpha \gamma}\) to let the retailer be a willing participant of the channel. We have

\[
\begin{cases}
\frac{dU}{dw} = \frac{b(1+\alpha + \alpha \gamma)(w - c)(a_0 a_\mu \gamma - a_0 a - 1 - a_0)}{2(1+\alpha)^2} \\
\frac{d^2U}{dw^2} = \frac{b(1+\alpha + \alpha \gamma)(a_0 a_\mu \gamma - a_0 a - 1 - a_0)}{2(1+\alpha)^2}
\end{cases} \quad (C47)
\]

Therefore,

\[
\begin{cases}
w^* = c, p = p^*, U^* = \frac{(a-bc)(1+\alpha + \alpha \gamma - a_0 a - 1 - a_0)}{4b(1+\alpha + \alpha \gamma)} & \text{if } a_0 \leq \frac{1+\alpha}{\alpha \mu \gamma - 1 - \alpha} \\
w^* > c, p > p^*, U^* > \frac{(a-bc)(1+\alpha + \alpha \gamma - a_0 a - 1 - a_0)}{4b(1+\alpha + \alpha \gamma)} & \text{if } a_0 > \frac{1+\alpha}{\alpha \mu \gamma - 1 - \alpha} \quad (C48)
\end{cases}
\]

Case 2. Harmonious channel: \(\mu \gamma \leq 1 + \frac{1}{\alpha}\). In a harmonious channel, the manufacturer’s utility is given by

\[
U(w, F) = (w - c)(a - b\bar{p}_1) + F - \beta_0[(w - c)(a - b\bar{p}_1) + F - \mu(\bar{p}_1 - w)(a - b\bar{p}_1) + \mu F] \quad (C49)
\]

Again, the manufacturer will choose a fixed payment \(F = \frac{(\bar{p}_1 - w)(a - b\bar{p}_1)(1+\alpha)(a - b\bar{p}_1)(w - c)}{1+\alpha + \alpha \gamma}\) in order for the retailer to be willing to participate in the channel. We have

\[
\begin{cases}
\frac{dU}{dw} = -\frac{b(1+\alpha + \alpha \gamma)(w - c)(a_0 a_\beta + 1 - \beta_0 + \beta_0 a_\mu \gamma)}{2(1+\alpha)^2} \\
\frac{d^2U}{dw^2} = -\frac{b(1+\alpha + \alpha \gamma)(a_0 a_\beta + 1 - \beta_0 + \beta_0 a_\mu \gamma)}{2(1+\alpha)^2} < 0
\end{cases} \quad (C50)
\]
Therefore,

\[ w^* = c, \ p = p^*, \ U^* = \frac{(a - bc)^2(1 - \beta_0 + \alpha - \alpha \beta_0 + \beta_0 \alpha \mu \gamma)}{4b(1 + \alpha + \alpha \gamma)} > 0 \] (C51)

Similar with the results in the single wholesale price case, the manufacturer’s concern of fairness will not change its choice of \((w, F)\) in an acrimonious channel, unless it is very adverse to its own disadvantageous inequality, \(i.e., \ \alpha_0 > \frac{1 + \alpha}{\alpha \mu \gamma - 1 - \alpha} \). In an acrimonious channel in which the manufacturer is not too averse to disadvantageous inequality or in a harmonious channel, the manufacturer will always offer the contract \((w, F) = [c, \ \frac{(a - bc)^2(1 + \alpha)}{4b(1 + \alpha + \alpha \gamma)}] \), which induces the retailer to choose the channel coordinating retail price \(p^*\).

**Fair Minded Manufacturer and Retailer with Quantity Discount**

When the manufacturer would like to use quantity discount to induce the retailer to choose the channel coordinating retail price \(p^*\) and the manufacturer cares about fairness, it will use the following quantity discount scheme:

\[ w = \frac{1}{1 + \alpha + \alpha \gamma}[(1 - k_1 + \alpha)p(D) + \alpha \gamma c + k_1 c - \frac{k_2}{D}], \] (C52)

with the constraints that the retailer has non-negative utility and that the retailer is having disadvantageous inequality utility at the channel coordinating retail price \(p = p^*\)

\[ \begin{cases} k_2 \geq k_2^0, \\ w > \frac{p^* + \gamma c}{1 + \gamma} = \frac{a + bc + 2 \beta \gamma c}{2b(1 + \gamma)} \end{cases} \] (C53)

where we define \(k_2^0 = -k_1 \frac{(a - bc)^2}{4b}\). If the manufacturer does not have concern of fairness, it will choose \(k_2 = k_2^0\) and the maximum payoff for the manufacturer is given by equation (4.5).

If the manufacturer cares about fairness, the difference between its profit and equitable profit
is given by

\[ [\mu(p^*-w)-(w-c)]D(p^*) = \frac{4b(1+\mu)k_2 + (k_1 - 1 - \alpha + \mu\alpha\gamma + \mu k_1)(a-bc)^2}{4b(1+\mu)} \begin{cases} > 0 & \text{if } k_2 > \bar{k}_2 \\ = 0 & \text{if } k_2 = \bar{k}_2 \\ < 0 & \text{if } k_2 < \bar{k}_2 \end{cases} \]

where \( \bar{k}_2 = \frac{(k_1 - 1 - \alpha + \mu\alpha\gamma + \mu k_1)(a-bc)^2}{4b(1+\mu)} \).

**Case 1. Acrimonious channel:** \( \mu\gamma > 1 + \frac{1}{\alpha} \), i.e., \( 1 + \alpha - \mu\gamma\alpha < 0 \). In an acrimonious channel, we have \( k_2 \geq \bar{k}_2^0 > \bar{k}_2 \) for any \( k_1 > 0 \). That is, the manufacturer will have disadvantageous inequality for any \( k_1 > 0 \). Since \( \frac{\partial U}{\partial k_2} = -\frac{1+\alpha_0\mu+\alpha_0}{1+\alpha+\alpha_0} \gamma \leq 0 \), the manufacturer will choose \( k_2 = \bar{k}_2^0 \) and its utility will be given by

\[ U = \frac{(a-bc)^2(\alpha_0 + \alpha + \alpha_0\alpha + 1 - \alpha_0\mu\alpha\gamma)}{4b(1+\alpha+\alpha_0)} \begin{cases} \geq 0 & \text{if } \alpha_0 \leq \frac{1+\alpha}{\alpha_\mu\gamma-1-\alpha} \\ < 0 & \text{if } \alpha_0 > \frac{1+\alpha}{\alpha_\mu\gamma-1-\alpha} \end{cases} . \] (C54)

Therefore,

\[ \begin{cases} k_2^* = \bar{k}_2^0, & p = p^* , \quad U^* = \frac{(a-bc)^2(\alpha_0 + \alpha + \alpha_0\alpha + 1 - \alpha_0\mu\alpha\gamma)}{4b(1+\alpha+\alpha_0)} \quad \text{for } \alpha_0 \leq \frac{1+\alpha}{\alpha_\mu\gamma-1-\alpha} \\ p \neq p^*, & U^* > \frac{(a-bc)^2(\alpha_0 + \alpha + \alpha_0\alpha + 1 - \alpha_0\mu\alpha\gamma)}{4b(1+\alpha+\alpha_0)} \quad \text{for } \alpha_0 > \frac{1+\alpha}{\alpha_\mu\gamma-1-\alpha} . \end{cases} \] (C55)

That is, if \( \mu\gamma > 1 + \frac{1}{\alpha} \) and \( \alpha_0 \leq \frac{1+\alpha}{\alpha_\mu\gamma-1-\alpha} \), then the fair minded manufacturer will still choose both the quantity discount scheme as given by equation (C52) and \( k_2 = \bar{k}_2^0 \) as it does without concern of fairness. If \( \mu\gamma > 1 + \frac{1}{\alpha} \) and \( \alpha_0 > \frac{1+\alpha}{\alpha_\mu\gamma-1-\alpha} \), however, the manufacturer will not choose the quantity discount scheme (C52) since even the optimal solution \( \bar{k}_2^0 \) will provide it with negative utility.

**Case 2. Harmonious channel:** \( \mu\gamma \leq 1 + \frac{1}{\alpha} \). In a harmonious channel, we have \( \bar{k}_2 \geq \bar{k}_2^0 \). If choosing \( k_2 \geq \bar{k}_2 \), the manufacturer gets a utility \( U = \frac{(a-bc)^2}{4b(1+\mu)} \). If choosing \( k_2 < \bar{k}_2 \), the manufacturer is having disutility from advantageous inequality and we have

\[ \begin{cases} k_2^* = \bar{k}_2^0, & p = p^*, \quad U^* = \frac{(a-bc)^2(1+\alpha - \alpha_0\beta_0 + \beta_0\mu\alpha\gamma)}{4b(1+\alpha+\alpha_0)} > 0 \quad \text{if } \beta_0 \leq \frac{1}{1+\mu} \\ \bar{k}_2^*, & p = p^*, \quad U^* = \frac{(a-bc)^2\mu}{4b(1+\mu)} > 0 \quad \text{if } \beta_0 > \frac{1}{1+\mu} . \end{cases} \] (C56)

Therefore, the fair minded manufacturer will still choose \( k_2^* = \bar{k}_2^0 \) as it does in \( \alpha_0 = \beta_0 = 0 \) scenario, if it has small inequality aversion parameters \( \alpha_0 \) and \( \beta_0 \). Only in an acrimonious channel
with \( \alpha_0 > \frac{1+\alpha}{\alpha\gamma-1-\alpha} \) or in a harmonious channel with \( \beta_0 > \frac{1}{1+\mu} \) it will deviate from \( k_2 = \bar{k}_2 \). In the latter case, however, it will still use the proposed quantity discount scheme with \( k_2^* = \bar{k}_2 \), which induces the retailer to choose the channel coordinating retail price \( p^* \).

**Technical Appendix D**

**Proof of Nash Bargaining Resolution.** Given any negotiated wholesale price \( w \), firms’ utilities are given by Equations (6.3) and (6.4). We first consider the case where the negotiated price is within \( w_2 \leq w \leq w_1 \). The other two cases can be solved in a similar way. The first step is to compute the negotiated wholesale price that will maximize the product of firms’ utilities with constraints \( w_2 \leq w \leq w_1 \). The next step is to derive the corresponding retail price \( p(w) \) and firms’ utilities. We will show that the channel can be coordinated under certain conditions. After that, negotiated wholesale price \( w \) and firms’ utilities of the other two cases are derived. The final step is to show that under the channel coordinating conditions above, neither firm will get higher utility by deviating to any other negotiated wholesale price \( w \).

If the manufacturer and retailer negotiate the wholesale price in the range of \( w_2 \leq w \leq w_1 \), their utilities are given by

\[
\begin{align*}
U(w) &= (w - c)(a - bw - b\gamma(w - c)) \\
u(w) &= \gamma(w - c)[a - bw - b\gamma(w - c)]
\end{align*}
\]

(D1)

Since firms will obtain zero profits and utilities when no agreement on wholesale price is made, they will negotiate to maximize the product of their utilities as given below

\[
\max_w \quad U(w) \cdot u(w) = \gamma(w - c)^2[a - bw - b\gamma(w - c)]^2
\]

(D2)

s.t. \( w_2 \leq w \leq w_1 \).

(D3)
It is easy to show that the objective function \( U(w) \cdot u(w) \) is increasing for any \( c < w < w_{II} \) and decreasing for any \( w_{II} < w < \frac{a+b+c}{b(1+\gamma)} \), and \( w_1 \) is always smaller than \( \frac{a+b+c}{b(1+\gamma)} \). Using Lagrange function, we solve the optimization problem and the solution is given by

\[
\begin{align*}
  w = \begin{cases} 
  \bar{w}_{II} = \frac{a+bc+2b\gamma c}{2b(1+\gamma)} & \text{for } \frac{1}{1+\gamma} \leq \beta < 1 \\
  w_2 = \frac{a-a\beta-b\gamma c+2b\gamma c}{b(1-\beta-\beta\gamma+2\gamma)} & \text{for } 0 < \beta < \frac{1}{1+\gamma}
\end{cases}
\]

(D4)

Therefore, for \( \frac{1}{1+\gamma} \leq \beta < 1 \), the negotiated wholesale price \( w \), the retail price \( p \), and firms’ utilities are given below

\[
\begin{align*}
  \begin{cases} 
  w = \bar{w}_{II} \\
  p = p^* = \frac{a+bc}{2b} \\
  U = \Pi = \frac{(a-bc)^2}{4b(1+\gamma)} \\
  u = \pi = \frac{(a-bc)^2}{4b(1+\gamma)}
\end{cases}
\]

(D5)

For \( \frac{1}{1+\gamma} \leq \beta < 1 \), it is also possible for firms to negotiate a wholesale price \( w \) such that \( w \geq w_1 \) or \( w \leq w_2 \). Firms’ utilities in each case are given by

\[
\begin{align*}
  \text{For } w \geq w_1 : \quad & \begin{cases} 
  w = w_1 = \frac{a+bc+2b\gamma c}{b(1+\alpha+\alpha\gamma+2\gamma)} \\
  U = \Pi = \frac{\gamma(a-bc)^2(1+\alpha)}{b(1+\alpha+\alpha\gamma+2\gamma)^2} \\
  u = \pi = \frac{\gamma^2(a-bc)^2}{b(1+\alpha+\alpha\gamma+2\gamma)^2}
\end{cases} \\
  \text{For } w \leq w_2 : \quad & \begin{cases} 
  w = c \\
  U = \Pi = 0 \\
  u = \frac{(a-bc)^2(1-\beta)}{4b}
\end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

(D6) (D7)

It is easy to show that for \( \frac{1}{1+\gamma} \leq \beta < 1 \), both firms will have higher utilities for \( w_2 \leq w \leq w_1 \) than for either \( w \leq w_2 \) or \( w \geq w_1 \). That is, neither firm will get a higher utility by deviating from equilibrium (D5) to either bargaining outcome (D6) or outcome (D7).